基金资助:capital injecting, reloaning, property-rights, central bank independence
Corresponding Author(s):
This paper builds a micro-behavior model of central bank and financial
institutions from the perspective of property-rights. By analyzing the theoretical
model and the practice, we conclude that, in the framework of the present
financial stabilization policies in China, the central bank’s functions of monetary
policy and financial stabilization are enslaved to financial institutions. Thus,
central bank independence has been damaged because of the actual
property-right relation between the central bank and the financial institutions.
The policy implication is to cut off the property-right relation between the
central bank and the financial institutions.
引用本文:
. [J]. Frontiers of Economics in China, 2008, 3(1): 24-37.
Center for Economic Research, Shandong University, Jinan 250100, China
School of Economics, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081, China. Property-rights, financial stabilization policies,
and central bank independence. Front. Econ. China, 2008, 3(1): 24-37.
