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Frontiers of Economics in China

ISSN 1673-3444

ISSN 1673-3568(Online)

CN 11-5744/F

邮发代号 80-978

Frontiers of Economics in China  2008, Vol. 3 Issue (4): 513-530   https://doi.org/10.1007/s11459-008-0025-5
  research-article 本期目录
Reputation, control rights and game equilibrium -A game analytical framework and application to SOEs in China
Reputation, control rights and game equilibrium -A game analytical framework and application to SOEs in China
LI Junlin 1, LI TianyouSchool of Economics, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China 2
1.School of Economics, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China; 2.
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Abstract

Using the reputation model of Kreps (1982), Vickers (1986) and Barro(1986), we develop a dynamic game model with incomplete information to examine the relations between the managers of state-owned enterprises(SOEs) in China and the government as the enterprise’s owner. Employing the model, we show that even a noncoopertive manager will not intrude the owner’s interests until the last period of his term in order to maximize his long term utility. The paper also discusses some phenomenona in state-owned enterprises in China, such as “insiders’ control”, “59 phenomenon” and excess on-the-job consumption.

Key wordsreputation    control rights    SOEs    equilibrium
出版日期: 2008-12-05
Corresponding Author(s): LI Junlin,Email:Junlin.lee@ruc.edu.cn   
 引用本文:   
. Reputation, control rights and game equilibrium -A game analytical framework and application to SOEs in China[J]. Frontiers of Economics in China, 2008, 3(4): 513-530.
LI Junlin , LI TianyouSchool of Economics,   Renmin University of China,   Beijing 100872, China. Reputation, control rights and game equilibrium -A game analytical framework and application to SOEs in China. Front Econ Chin, 2008, 3(4): 513-530.
 链接本文:  
https://academic.hep.com.cn/fec/CN/10.1007/s11459-008-0025-5
https://academic.hep.com.cn/fec/CN/Y2008/V3/I4/513
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