A Closed Form Characterization of the Stationary Outcome in Multilateral Bargaining
A Closed Form Characterization of the Stationary Outcome in Multilateral Bargaining
Yi Jin1, Jianbo Zhang2()
1. Department of Economics, Monash University, Caulfield East, VIC 3145, Australia; 2. Department of Economics, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66045, USA
In this paper we consider infinite horizon multilateral bargaining with alternate offers. We prove that there exists only one stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcome and it corresponds to the unique invariantmeasure of a column stochastic matrix. We characterize this stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in a closed form, and also extend the approach to the multilateral bargaining with random moves.
. A Closed Form Characterization of the Stationary Outcome in Multilateral Bargaining[J]. Frontiers of Economics in China, 2013, 8(2): 272-287.
Yi Jin, Jianbo Zhang. A Closed Form Characterization of the Stationary Outcome in Multilateral Bargaining. Front Econ Chin, 2013, 8(2): 272-287.
