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Frontiers of Economics in China

ISSN 1673-3444

ISSN 1673-3568(Online)

CN 11-5744/F

邮发代号 80-978

Frontiers of Economics in China  2015, Vol. 10 Issue (3): 449-466   https://doi.org/10.3868/s060-004-015-0019-4
  本期目录
Learning and Efficiency with Search Frictions
Xi Weng()
Department of Applied Economics, Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
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Abstract

This paper studies the allocative efficiency in a Moscarini (2005)-type equilibrium search environment with learning. It is shown that the stationary equilibrium is efficient if and only if the Hosios condition holds no matter whether learning is about firm-specific human capital or about general human capital. However, the stationary equilibrium can never be efficient if externalities exist from unemployment. In contrast, even with externalities, the stationary equilibrium can be efficient under some modified Hosios condition if there is no uncertainty (standard Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)-type equilibrium search environment). The key intuition is that the equilibrium can only be efficient if firm-worker matching is formed and terminated efficiently.

Key wordslearning    efficiency    search friction    Nash bargaining    firm specific human capital    general human capital
出版日期: 2015-10-22
 引用本文:   
. [J]. Frontiers of Economics in China, 2015, 10(3): 449-466.
Xi Weng. Learning and Efficiency with Search Frictions. Front. Econ. China, 2015, 10(3): 449-466.
 链接本文:  
https://academic.hep.com.cn/fec/CN/10.3868/s060-004-015-0019-4
https://academic.hep.com.cn/fec/CN/Y2015/V10/I3/449
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