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Frontiers of Economics in China

ISSN 1673-3444

ISSN 1673-3568(Online)

CN 11-5744/F

邮发代号 80-978

Frontiers of Economics in China  2015, Vol. 10 Issue (3): 467-482   https://doi.org/10.3868/s060-004-015-0020-8
  本期目录
A Syntactic Approach to Knowledge in Finite Games of Perfect Information
Wenzhang Zhang()
School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, China
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Abstract

In this paper I present a syntactic approach to modeling the interactive knowledge of rationality in finite games of perfect information. This approach allows for a more transparent interpretation. In particular, we have the intuitive picture of viewing knowledge as the input and decisions as the output of a player’s deliberation. This distinction is blurred in the semantic state-space approach.

Key wordsknowledge    rationality    backward induction    games of perfect information
出版日期: 2015-10-22
 引用本文:   
. [J]. Frontiers of Economics in China, 2015, 10(3): 467-482.
Wenzhang Zhang. A Syntactic Approach to Knowledge in Finite Games of Perfect Information. Front. Econ. China, 2015, 10(3): 467-482.
 链接本文:  
https://academic.hep.com.cn/fec/CN/10.3868/s060-004-015-0020-8
https://academic.hep.com.cn/fec/CN/Y2015/V10/I3/467
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