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Frontiers of Economics in China

ISSN 1673-3444

ISSN 1673-3568(Online)

CN 11-5744/F

Postal Subscription Code 80-978

Front. Econ. China    2017, Vol. 12 Issue (4) : 635-659    https://doi.org/10.3868/s060-006-017-0026-8
Orginal Article |
Decision Making and Ability: An Explanation of Elitism in China’s Government
Shiqiang Li()
School of Economics, University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100089, China
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Abstract

This article tries to explain elitism in China’s governmental decision making. Our model shows that the governments’ expected utility increases with a bureaucrat’s ability to make decisions under the flexible framework of delegation and communication (with separated reporting strategy). In the early of 1950s, China’s government choose a flexible decision making framework in order to efficiently manage many affairs in a complex environment. This initial choice started the process of a self-reinforcing demand for ability inside of the flexible decision making framework. With the current reforms of streamlining administrations and retreating from the market, the elitism of China’s government might reverse.

Keywords elitism      decision rule, China      delegation      communication, bureaucrat     
Issue Date: 08 December 2017
 Cite this article:   
Shiqiang Li. Decision Making and Ability: An Explanation of Elitism in China’s Government[J]. Front. Econ. China, 2017, 12(4): 635-659.
 URL:  
http://academic.hep.com.cn/fec/EN/10.3868/s060-006-017-0026-8
http://academic.hep.com.cn/fec/EN/Y2017/V12/I4/635
[1] Yue Shen, Youjun Xu, Jingming Hao. Strategic Incentive in Mixed Oligopoly[J]. Front Econ Chin, 2011, 6(2): 311-326.
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