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A Syntactic Approach to Knowledge in Finite Games of Perfect Information |
Wenzhang Zhang() |
School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, China |
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Abstract In this paper I present a syntactic approach to modeling the interactive knowledge of rationality in finite games of perfect information. This approach allows for a more transparent interpretation. In particular, we have the intuitive picture of viewing knowledge as the input and decisions as the output of a player’s deliberation. This distinction is blurred in the semantic state-space approach.
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Keywords
knowledge
rationality
backward induction
games of perfect information
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Issue Date: 22 October 2015
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