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Frontiers of Philosophy in China

ISSN 1673-3436

ISSN 1673-355X(Online)

CN 11-5743/B

邮发代号 80-983

Frontiers of Philosophy in China  2015, Vol. 10 Issue (2): 298-310   https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-004-015-0022-1
  本期目录
On Kripke’s Dogmatism Paradox: A Logical Dynamical Analysis
XU Zhaoqing()
Department of Philosophy, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China
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Abstract

As a byproduct of solving the surprise-exam paradox, Saul Kripke formulates a “dogmatism paradox” which seems to show that knowledge entails dogmatism. In this paper, the author analyzes the nature of the dogmatism paradox from a logical dynamical perspective. The author suggests that the dogmatism paradox is better understood as a paradox of knowledge attribution rather than of knowledge. Therefore, the dogmatism paradox could be solved without sacrificing the principle of epistemic closure. Based on a famous version of relevant alternatives theory, the author formalizes a logic of knowledge attribution in the style of logical dynamics, namely, public retraction logic, and analyzes how knowledge attributions are retracted with the expansion of relevant alternatives.

Key wordsdogmatism paradox    epistemic closure    knowledge attribution    relevant alternatives    public retraction logic
出版日期: 2015-06-19
 引用本文:   
. [J]. Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 2015, 10(2): 298-310.
XU Zhaoqing. On Kripke’s Dogmatism Paradox: A Logical Dynamical Analysis. Front. Philos. China, 2015, 10(2): 298-310.
 链接本文:  
https://academic.hep.com.cn/fpc/CN/10.3868/s030-004-015-0022-1
https://academic.hep.com.cn/fpc/CN/Y2015/V10/I2/298
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