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The Tradition of Emotive Writing in the Zhuangzi and Its Echoes in Later Generations
CHEN Guying
Frontiers of Philosophy in China. 2015, 10 (3): 340-352.
https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-004-015-0028-3
As the concluding part of a series of essays on theories of humanity in the Zhuangzi, this essay aims at describing the theme of qing 情 (emotion) as a dual-directional attitude towards qing as a partner to xing 性 (nature) and the influence of this domain of thought on later generations and their continued discussion of it. Faced with a forcible divorce of qing and xing at the hand of Han Dynasty Ruists, which would lock perceptions into a rigid dualist framework, the Wei and Jin period saw authors such as Wang Bi and Ji Kang return to a more faithful rendering of the theme of qing in the classics, the Laozi and Zhuangzi, seeing it become an ever more explicit philosophical topic and beginning a lengthy period of discussion of the theme of qing. In the Northern Song period, representative thinkers Zhang Zai and Wang Anshi The Northern Song tradition constitute a continuance of Pre-Qin Daoist philosophical ideas, providing a logical reinterpretation of the indivisibility of qing and xing from a syncretist approach to the Daoist and Ruist traditions, in a way that drastically differs from the Southern Song preference for xing at the cost of qing, as represented by thinkers such as the Brothers Cheng and Zhu Xi. At the bottom of it, this continued tradition draws from themes that appear in the Zhuangzi, a holistic approach to life and the relationship between humanity and nature, an important and continuous thread in the fabric of human civilisation.
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Authenticity in the Zhuangzi ? Contemporary Misreadings of Zhen 真and an Alternative to Existentialism
Paul J. D’Ambrosio
Frontiers of Philosophy in China. 2015, 10 (3): 353-379.
https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-004-015-0029-0
This essay reviews the Zhuangzian notion of zhen 真, often through the text’s advancement of the zhenren 真人 (“genuine person,” “true person”) or zhenzhi 真知 (“genuine knowledge,” “true knowledge”). Contemporary scholarship, in both Chinese and English, often presents zhen as analogous to the existentialist theory of authenticity, which correspondingly reflects on interpretations of the “self,” and thereby the zhen person. Much of the Zhuangzi is a reaction to the Lunyu, including an ironic response to the Confucian cultivation project. If we establish our interpretation of the “self” against this background then we find that zhen in the Zhuangzi is actually used to argue against the Confucian identification of the person and self through social roles or conventions. However, advocating zhen does not suggest that there is some essential or core “self” to refer to; instead, it implies a natural state of responsiveness where the person acts efficaciously by being in line with what is obvious or affirmed in the situation. This essay thereby presents a reading of zhen that is historically and culturally consistent, and sets up the Zhuangzi as an alternative, and not an echo, to some of the major issues dealt with by the existentialist movement.
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The Spatiality of Cognition in the Zhuangzi
Joanna Guzowska
Frontiers of Philosophy in China. 2015, 10 (3): 415-429.
https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-004-015-0031-1
In this paper I explore the conception of cognition and action found in the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi. More specifically, I focus on the role of explicit and implicit spatial imagery in the context of this complex problem. Spatial imagery suggests that cognition is understood as fundamentally bimodal in the text: (1) the default modality, which is informed by an entrenched distinction pattern, is cast in terms of fullness and bulk; and (2) the auxiliary modality, which is free from this kind of constraint, is imagined in terms of emptiness and lack of bulk, as an axis or point. The latter is the preferred mode of engagement with the environment, according to the Zhuangzi. Spatial imagery brings out the crucial characteristics of this cognitive modality: its radical openness and infinite fecundity in the context of distinction–drawing and action. It also connects with other metaphorical schemata at work in the text, including organic imagery. Interestingly, the notion of emptiness and the figure of an axis do not mark an experience of undifferentiated oneness but the state of heightened sensitivity to the makeup of one’s environment. Such sensitivity allows the agent to entertain the situation at hand without bias and to move around (relatively) conflict–free.
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Is Intuition Necessary for Defending Platonism?
XU Difei
Frontiers of Philosophy in China. 2015, 10 (3): 492-509.
https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-004-015-0036-6
G?del asserts that his philosophy falls under the category of conceptual realism. This paper gives a general picture of G?del’s conceptual realism’s basic doctrines, and gives a way to understand conceptual realism in the background of Leibniz’s and Kant’s philosophies. Among philosophers of mathematics, there is a widespread view that Platonism encounters an epistemological difficulty because we do not have sensations of abstract objects. In his writings, G?del asserts that we have mathematical intuitions of mathematical objects. Some philosophers do not think it is necessary to resort to intuition to defend Platonism, and other philosophers think that the arguments resorting to intuition are too na?ve to be convincing. I argue that the epistemic difficulty is not particular to Platonism; when faced with skepticism, physicalists also need to give an answer concerning the relationship between our experience and reality. G?del and Kant both think that sensations or combinations of sensations are not ideas of physical objects, but that, to form ideas of physical objects, concepts must be added. However, unlike Kant, G?del thinks that concepts are not subjective but independent of our minds. Based on my analysis of G?del’s conceptual realism, I give an answer to the question in the title and show that arguments resorting to intuition are far from na?ve, despite what some philosophers have claimed.
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