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The Symbolism of the Body in Daoism
CHENG Lesong
Frontiers of Philosophy in China. 2017, 12 (1): 54-71.
https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-006-017-0005-6
The body is the center of Daoist practice. In addition to being the carrier of feelings, experiences, and actions, it also plays a major role in the construction and interpretation of religious meanings. What is important here is how it serves as the starting point and springboard for practitioners seeking either to obtain the ideal state of being or acquire transcendent powers. This article explores the formation of the body as a symbol in Daoism, and analyzes its corresponding implications. I attempt to do this through a close textual reading of Daoist texts and a critical review of previous academic work on the Daoist conception of body. Within Daoism, the body is neither some physical object, nor a spirit-flesh hybrid that is the subject of theological reflection. It is the vehicle to immortality, and is in itself a small pantheon to be discovered and promoted. As such, it is an open and rich symbol that both generates and integrates meanings on different levels. The symbol of the body not only brings together diverse meanings, but it also provides a conduit through which these meanings are expressed. After taking on religious meaning, the body comes to actualize its potentiality through Daoist practice and cultivation.
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Growth, Experience and Nature in Dewey’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy
LIU Jing
Frontiers of Philosophy in China. 2017, 12 (1): 90-103.
https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-006-017-0007-0
Growth is an important concept in Dewey’s philosophy, and, indeed, its ultimate focus. It is not, however, an easy task to posit growth as an ethical ideal, for here Dewey immediately faces a metaphysical dilemma: whether to offer us an objective standard of growth, which becomes a type of absolutism, or to inevitably fall into relativism. This paper explores how Dewey avoids this dilemma with his concept of experience, which is interrogated through the relationship between human beings and nature. Still, human growth in nature involves the cultivation of virtuosities (de 德) in accordance with the rhythm of nature, and requires a completely different way of life other than our technological one. For this reason, I use Chinese philosophy, specifically ideas from the Yijing, to show how growth can be illustrated through the interaction between humans and the natural world.
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Between Darwin and Hegel: On Dewey’s Concept of Experience
CHEN Yajun
Frontiers of Philosophy in China. 2017, 12 (1): 104-119.
https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-006-017-0008-7
“Experience” is so central to Dewey’s philosophy that one must, first of all, understand what he means by the term. Diverging from the traditional conception of experience, Dewey’s understanding involves two dimensions, namely, naturalism and historicism; in this, it can be seen as the unification of Darwinism and Hegelianism. Without attending to its dimension of naturalism, one would ignore experience’s basic character, namely that of receptivity, while without attending to the aspect of historicism, one would ignore experience’s dimension of meaning, its character of spontaneity. Dewey’s notion of experience is unique. Its true value can be seen more clearly in comparison with the conceptions of experience advanced by Quine and McDowell.
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Critique, Ethics, and the Apparatus of Experience: A Foucauldian Framework
Timothy O’Leary
Frontiers of Philosophy in China. 2017, 12 (1): 120-136.
https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-006-017-0009-4
The paper explores examples of contemporary experience in order to demonstrate the moralisation of new areas of behaviour (especially in relation to environmental issues). It sketches a Foucauldian framework for understanding the historical transformation of experience, in terms of the “apparatus of experience.” On that basis, it presents a novel account of critique, in which critique is seen as the potentially transformational, experiential practice of re-experiencing the contemporary apparatuses of experience. In other words, critique is “experience squared.” It is this re-experiencing of our everyday experience that permits us, to a certain extent, to “get over ourselves” and thus to reflect critically on the processes of moralisation and de-moralisation in which we participate.
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