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Frontiers of Philosophy in China

ISSN 1673-3436

ISSN 1673-355X(Online)

CN 11-5743/B

Postal Subscription Code 80-983

Front Phil Chin    2012, Vol. 7 Issue (4) : 519-532     DOI: 10.3868/s030-001-012-0034-0
research-article |
Ethos and Habituation in Aristotle
YU Jiyuan()
Department of Philosophy, State Universiy of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260, USA School of Philosophy and Social Development, Shandong University, Ji’nan 250100, China
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This paper is concerned with Aristotle’s theory of habituation, focusing on the following three issues: (1) the relation between habit and reason, (2) human nature and habituation, and (3) the roles of family and politics in habituation. Aristotle’s theory of habituation has been a topic of interest recently. Yet so far, most debates about this topic are about the first issue. This paper will bring in the second and the third issues, in order to provide a complete picture of the theory. To be more specific, the paper seeks to better understand the following three claims of Aristotle, corresponding to the three issues mentioned above: (1) “We become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts” (NE 1103a34–b1) . (2) “We are adapted by nature to receive virtues, and are made perfect by habit” (teleuioumenois de dia tou ethous) (1103a25–26). (3) “One’s own good cannot exist without household management, nor without a form of government” (1142a9–11).

Keywords Aristotle      habituation      virtue      ethos      intellectualism      practical wisdom     
Corresponding Authors: YU Jiyuan,   
Issue Date: 05 December 2012
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