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Frontiers of Philosophy in China

ISSN 1673-3436

ISSN 1673-355X(Online)

CN 11-5743/B

Postal Subscription Code 80-983

Front Phil Chin    2013, Vol. 8 Issue (3) : 485-497
research-article |
Does Conditional Affordance Imply Representational Non-Conceptual Content?
HUANG Xiang()
School of Philosophy, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China
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Jan Alm?ng believes that James J. Gibson’s notion of affordances offers a reason to reject John McDowell’s thesis that representational perceptual content is conceptual through and through. I argue that Alm?ng’s arguments for the claim that the perceptual content in which conditional affordances feature can be both representational and non-conceptual are questionable.

Keywords perceptual content      affordance      John McDowell      Jan Alm?ng     
Corresponding Authors: HUANG Xiang,   
Issue Date: 05 September 2013
 Cite this article:   
HUANG Xiang. Does Conditional Affordance Imply Representational Non-Conceptual Content?[J]. Front Phil Chin, 2013, 8(3): 485-497.
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