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Does Conditional Affordance Imply Representational Non-Conceptual Content? |
HUANG Xiang() |
School of Philosophy, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China |
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Abstract Jan Alm?ng believes that James J. Gibson’s notion of affordances offers a reason to reject John McDowell’s thesis that representational perceptual content is conceptual through and through. I argue that Alm?ng’s arguments for the claim that the perceptual content in which conditional affordances feature can be both representational and non-conceptual are questionable.
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Keywords
perceptual content
affordance
John McDowell
Jan Alm?ng
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Corresponding Author(s):
HUANG Xiang,Email:hangxiang@fudan.edu.cn
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Issue Date: 05 September 2013
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