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Frontiers of Philosophy in China

ISSN 1673-3436

ISSN 1673-355X(Online)

CN 11-5743/B

Postal Subscription Code 80-983

Front. Philos. China    2015, Vol. 10 Issue (3) : 474-491    https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-004-015-0035-9
research-article |
Can Physical Parts of Substances Be Substances? The Dual Models of Analysis in Aristotle’s Notion of Substance
GE Tianqin()
Department of Philosophy, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310028, China
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Abstract

This essay discusses the question of whether the physical parts of a substance per se can still be substances after being separated from whole substances. This paper finds that within his corpus Aristotle gives two contrary answers to that question. To avoid this inconsistency, this essay claims that Aristotle puts forward dual models of analysis when it comes to substances, namely the Artifact Model and the Living Being Model. According to the Artifact Model, the physical parts of a substance per se are still substances after being separated from the whole substance; but according to the Living Being Model, the physical parts of a substance per se are not substances after separation. In addition, this paper also holds that there is a kind of evolutionary relationship of research methodology between the dual models, i.e. the dual models correspond to what is “better known to us” to what is “better known by nature.”

Keywords substance      physical parts      artifacts      living beings      models of analysis     
Issue Date: 28 October 2015
 Cite this article:   
GE Tianqin. Can Physical Parts of Substances Be Substances? The Dual Models of Analysis in Aristotle’s Notion of Substance[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2015, 10(3): 474-491.
 URL:  
http://academic.hep.com.cn/fpc/EN/10.3868/s030-004-015-0035-9
http://academic.hep.com.cn/fpc/EN/Y2015/V10/I3/474
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