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Frontiers of Philosophy in China

ISSN 1673-3436

ISSN 1673-355X(Online)

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Front. Philos. China    2015, Vol. 10 Issue (3) : 492-509    https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-004-015-0036-6
research-article |
Is Intuition Necessary for Defending Platonism?
XU Difei()
School of Philosophy, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China
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Abstract

G?del asserts that his philosophy falls under the category of conceptual realism. This paper gives a general picture of G?del’s conceptual realism’s basic doctrines, and gives a way to understand conceptual realism in the background of Leibniz’s and Kant’s philosophies. Among philosophers of mathematics, there is a widespread view that Platonism encounters an epistemological difficulty because we do not have sensations of abstract objects. In his writings, G?del asserts that we have mathematical intuitions of mathematical objects. Some philosophers do not think it is necessary to resort to intuition to defend Platonism, and other philosophers think that the arguments resorting to intuition are too na?ve to be convincing. I argue that the epistemic difficulty is not particular to Platonism; when faced with skepticism, physicalists also need to give an answer concerning the relationship between our experience and reality. G?del and Kant both think that sensations or combinations of sensations are not ideas of physical objects, but that, to form ideas of physical objects, concepts must be added. However, unlike Kant, G?del thinks that concepts are not subjective but independent of our minds. Based on my analysis of G?del’s conceptual realism, I give an answer to the question in the title and show that arguments resorting to intuition are far from na?ve, despite what some philosophers have claimed.

Keywords G?del’s conceptual realism      intuition      physicalism      concepts     
Issue Date: 28 October 2015
 Cite this article:   
XU Difei. Is Intuition Necessary for Defending Platonism?[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2015, 10(3): 492-509.
 URL:  
http://academic.hep.com.cn/fpc/EN/10.3868/s030-004-015-0036-6
http://academic.hep.com.cn/fpc/EN/Y2015/V10/I3/492
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