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Frontiers of Philosophy in China

ISSN 1673-3436

ISSN 1673-355X(Online)

CN 11-5743/B

Postal Subscription Code 80-983

Front. Philos. China    2016, Vol. 11 Issue (1) : 3-20
Orginal Article |
Does Wittgenstein Actually Undermine the Foundation of Artificial Intelligence?
XU Yingjin()
School of Philosophy, Fudan University, Shanghai 200235, China
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Wittgenstein is widely viewed as a potential critic of a key philosophical assumption of the Strong Artificial Intelligence (AI) thesis, namely, that it is in principle possible to build a programmed machine which can achieve real intelligence. Stuart Shanker has provided the most systematic reconstruction of the Wittgensteinian argument against AI, building on Wittgenstein’s own statements, the “rule-following” feature of language-games, and the putative alliance between AI and psychologism. This article will attempt to refute this reconstruction and its constituent arguments, thereby paving the way for a new and amicable rather than agonistic conception of the Wittgensteinian position on AI.

Keywords Strong Artificial Intelligence (AI)      rule-following      psychologism      algorithm     
Issue Date: 01 April 2016
 Cite this article:   
XU Yingjin. Does Wittgenstein Actually Undermine the Foundation of Artificial Intelligence?[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2016, 11(1): 3-20.
[1] XU Yingjin. What Does Fodor’s “Anti-Darwinism” Mean to Natural Theology?[J]. Front Phil Chin, 2011, 6(3): 465-479.
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