Please wait a minute...
Frontiers of Philosophy in China

ISSN 1673-3436

ISSN 1673-355X(Online)

CN 11-5743/B

Postal Subscription Code 80-983

Front. Philos. China    2016, Vol. 11 Issue (3) : 358-376    https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-005-016-0027-0
Orginal Article |
Max Scheler’s Phenomenology of Pain
Saulius Geniusas()
Department of Philosophy, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
 Download: PDF(260 KB)  
 Export: BibTeX | EndNote | Reference Manager | ProCite | RefWorks
Abstract

This paper offers a systematic account of Scheler’s phenomenology of pain, addresses its place in the history of the phenomenology of pain and traces its significance for pain research. Against the popular view, which maintains that for Scheler pain is a feeling-state, this paper argues that Scheler conceives of pain as an irreducibly ambiguous phenomenon: as both a non-intentional feeling-state and an intentional feeling. This paper further shows how this ambiguity leads Scheler to qualify pain as a stratified phenomenon, composed of causal, sensory, emotive and cognitive dimensions. This paper demonstrates how such a stratified conception enables one to draw meaningful distinctions between pain and other emotive phenomena, such as suffering, illness, and despair. This paper concludes with some remarks concerning the significance of Scheler’s phenomenology of pain for pain research.

Keywords Schele      phenomenology      pain      feelings      emotions     
Issue Date: 19 September 2016
 Cite this article:   
Saulius Geniusas. Max Scheler’s Phenomenology of Pain[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2016, 11(3): 358-376.
 URL:  
http://academic.hep.com.cn/fpc/EN/10.3868/s030-005-016-0027-0
http://academic.hep.com.cn/fpc/EN/Y2016/V11/I3/358
[1] Giulio Tononi, Owen Flanagan. Philosophy and Science Dialogue: Consciousness[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2018, 13(3): 332-348.
[2] JIANG Wei. Is Pain Representation?[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2017, 12(4): 648-665.
[3] Hye Young Kim. A Phenomenological Approach to the Korean “We”: A Study in Social Intentionality[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2017, 12(4): 612-632.
[4] Halla Kim. Existential Dimensions of Korean Neo-Confucianism: The Status of Emotions in the Four-Seven Debate[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2017, 12(4): 591-611.
[5] Patricia Huntington. Place as Refuge: Exploring the Poetical Legacy of Matsuo Bashō[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2017, 12(4): 572-590.
[6] Frank Schalow. A Diltheyan Loop? The Methodological Side of Heidegger’s Kant-Interpretation[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2016, 11(3): 377-394.
[7] Welsh Talia. Many Healths: Nietzsche and Phenomenologies of Illness[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2016, 11(3): 338-357.
[8] Tara Kennedy. The Ethics of Treating Animals as Resources: A Post-Heideggerian Approach[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2016, 11(3): 463-482.
[9] Megan Altman. Heidegger on the Struggle for Belongingness and Being at Home[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2016, 11(3): 444-462.
[10] JIN Xiping. Heidegger’s Conception of Being-with (Mitsein ) and His Simple Designation of Social and Political Reality in the Black Notebooks[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2016, 11(3): 415-429.
[11] François Raffoul. The Invisible and the Secret: Of a Phenomenology of the Inapparent[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2016, 11(3): 395-414.
[12] Annette Hilt. Traces of the Person: Max Scheler’s and Paul Ricoeur’s Attempts on Personal Ethics[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2015, 10(1): 130-147.
[13] WANG Tangjia. A Philosophical Analysis of the Concept of Crisis[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2014, 9(2): 254-267.
[14] John Sallis. Effacements of Form[J]. Front Phil Chin, 2013, 8(4): 641-654.
[15] Oliver Davies. Religion, Politics and Ethics: Towards a Global Theory of Social Transformation[J]. Front Phil Chin, 2012, 7(4): 572-597.
Viewed
Full text


Abstract

Cited

  Shared   
  Discussed