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Frontiers of Philosophy in China

ISSN 1673-3436

ISSN 1673-355X(Online)

CN 11-5743/B

Postal Subscription Code 80-983

Front. Philos. China    2017, Vol. 12 Issue (1) : 137-150    https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-006-017-0010-8
Orginal Article |
A Critical Examination of Anselm’s Ontological Argument
ZHANG Junguo()
UCD School of Philosophy, University College Dublin, Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland
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Abstract

This paper argues that St. Anselm’s distinction of the two senses of existence in his ontological argument for the existence of God renders Paul Tillich’s refutation of it invalid. At the same time, Anselm misuses the two types of existence in his ontological comparison, leading to a logical contradiction between the different kinds and degrees of existence. Since Anselm’s idea of different reference subjects does not coherently solve this logical absurdity, Anselm’s ontological argument falls well short of being a successful approach to establishing the existence of God.

Keywords Anselm      different reference subjects      existence      ontological comparison      Paul Tillich     
Issue Date: 24 April 2017
 Cite this article:   
ZHANG Junguo. A Critical Examination of Anselm’s Ontological Argument[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2017, 12(1): 137-150.
 URL:  
http://academic.hep.com.cn/fpc/EN/10.3868/s030-006-017-0010-8
http://academic.hep.com.cn/fpc/EN/Y2017/V12/I1/137
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[3] ZHANG Shuguang. Historicity and the modern situation of human existence: A reinterpretation of the views of Karl Marx[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2007, 2(1): 70-83.
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