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Frontiers of Philosophy in China

ISSN 1673-3436

ISSN 1673-355X(Online)

CN 11-5743/B

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Front. Philos. China    2018, Vol. 13 Issue (3) : 332-348    https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-007-018-0026-1
Orginal Article
Philosophy and Science Dialogue: Consciousness
Giulio Tononi1(), Owen Flanagan2()
1. School of Medicine, Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin–Madison, Madison, WI 53719, USA
2. Department of Philosophy, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA
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Abstract

This is a dialogue between a philosopher and a scientist about the scientific explanation of consciousness. What is consciousness? Does it admit of scientific explanation? If so, what must a scientific theory of consciousness be like in order to provide us with a satisfying explanation of its explanandum? And what types of entities might such a theory acknowledge as being conscious? Philosopher Owen Flanagan and scientist Giulio Tononi weigh in on these issues during an exchange about the nature and scientific explanation of consciousness.
Keywords consciousness      integrated information theory      phenomenology      hard problem of consciousness      scientific explanation     
Issue Date: 25 September 2018
 Cite this article:   
Giulio Tononi,Owen Flanagan. Philosophy and Science Dialogue: Consciousness[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2018, 13(3): 332-348.
 URL:  
https://academic.hep.com.cn/fpc/EN/10.3868/s030-007-018-0026-1
https://academic.hep.com.cn/fpc/EN/Y2018/V13/I3/332
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