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Frontiers of Philosophy in China

ISSN 1673-3436

ISSN 1673-355X(Online)

CN 11-5743/B

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Front. Philos. China    2015, Vol. 10 Issue (3) : 444-456    https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-004-015-0033-5
research-article
Adorno’s View of Life
LUO Songtao()
School of Philosophy, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China
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Abstract

The aim of this article is to reflect on the dialectic of the individual’s life and death in terms of Adorno’s moral philosophy, specifically through a thorough reading of his Negative Dialectics and other key works on the subject. I hold that there are two aspects of the dialectic of life within the context of Adorno’s “nonidentity”: one involves exploring the false identification, due to the reification of modern society, of the individual’s life experience with her or his death experience, while the other involves preserving the dialectical and irreducible tension between the theoretical contemplation of life and of historical conditions, as well as specific social systems. Heidegger’s ontological philosophy concerning Dasein and Kant’s categorical imperative will also be discussed in order to fully understand Adorno’s moral philosophy and his idea of nonidentity. From my point of view, Adorno’s moral philosophy is the prime motivator of his unique concept of nonidentity, and has influenced contemporary political philosophical concepts such as biopolitics (cf. G. Agamben).

Keywords dialectic of life      moral philosophy      nonidentity thought      reification      right life     
Issue Date: 28 October 2015
 Cite this article:   
LUO Songtao. Adorno’s View of Life[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2015, 10(3): 444-456.
 URL:  
https://academic.hep.com.cn/fpc/EN/10.3868/s030-004-015-0033-5
https://academic.hep.com.cn/fpc/EN/Y2015/V10/I3/444
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