A naturalistic interpretation of the Kripkean
modality

doi:10.1007/s11466-009-0029-y

Front. Philos. China

2009, Vol. 4

Issue (3) : 454-469 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11466-009-0029-y

Research articles

A naturalistic interpretation of the Kripkean modality

YE Feng ,

Department of Philosophy, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China;

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Abstract The Kripkean metaphysical modality (i.e. possibility and necessity) is one of the most important concepts in contemporary analytic philosophy and is the basis of many metaphysical speculations. These metaphysical speculations frequently commit to entities that do not belong to this physical universe, such as merely possible entities, abstract entities, mental entities or qualities not realizable by the physical, which seems to contradict naturalism or physicalism. This paper proposes a naturalistic interpretation of the Kripkean modality, as a naturalist’s response to these metaphysical speculations. It will show that naturalism can accommodate the Kripkean metaphysical modality. In particular, it will show that naturalism can help to resolve the puzzles surrounding Kripke’s a posteriori necessary propositions and a priori contingent propositions.

Keywords philosophy of language naturalism physicalism metaphysical modality Kripke

Issue Date: 05 September 2009

Cite this article:

YE Feng. A naturalistic interpretation of the Kripkean modality[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2009, 4(3): 454-469.

URL:

https://academic.hep.com.cn/fpc/EN/10.1007/s11466-009-0029-y
https://academic.hep.com.cn/fpc/EN/Y2009/V4/I3/454

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