%A ZHAO Meng %T The Embodied Subjective Perspective %0 Journal Article %D 2014 %J Front. Philos. China %J Frontiers of Philosophy in China %@ 1673-3436 %R 10.3868/s030-003-014-0023-4 %P 280-300 %V 9 %N 2 %U {https://academic.hep.com.cn/fpc/EN/10.3868/s030-003-014-0023-4 %8 2014-07-04 %X

Perspective is a distinctive feature of external perception. There is a question of how to account for perceptual constancy in spite of changing perspectives. Alva No? proposes the notion of “perspectival property” [P-property] and appeals to the perspectival aspect of perceptual content. His proposal conflicts with perceptual experiences and hence incurs many criticisms. Drawing on Husserl’s phenomenology and Gibsonian psychology, I propose the notion of “perspectival awareness” [P-awareness]. I will argue that P-awareness is embodied pre-thematic self-awareness instead of the experience of a special kind of objective property. With the notion of P-awareness in mind, I then elaborate on the embodied subjective feature of perspective.