In our times, philosophy has been suffering from a spiritual crisis that takes the forms of the crisis of culture, the crisis of meaning, and the crisis of way of life. As the soul of culture, philosophy should contribute valuable responses to the problems of our times. Thus understood, this paper intends to analyze the concept of crisis in a phenomenological approach. The concept of crisis is concerned with the philosophical themes of time and death, and the crises of our times are primarily the crises of life-meaning and the life-world. Drawing sources from Husserl and other phenomenologists, as well as experiences from Chinese culture, I argue that a philosophy of crisis should find its point of departure from the crisis of philosophy.

This paper examines two notions of possibility conceived by Kierkegaard and Zhuangzi respectively. Kierkegaard conceives of it with appeals to the feeling of anxiety, while Zhuangzi deals with it in terms of a type of aesthetic feeling. Based on these distinctions, the paper goes further to explore two types of human existence as fostered by these two corresponding concepts of possibility. According to Kierkegaard, in order to maintain a connection with possibility, which would provide freedom to human existence, one must have faith in the redeemer bringing back possibility so that an individual human being might renew his or her choice ceaselessly. Zhuangzi, on the other hand, advises staying in the realm of nothingness and letting go of all things to avoid being trapped by the struggle of discerning between good and evil.

Russell’s letter to Frege of June 16, 1902 contains the famous paradox of the class of all classes which are not members of themselves as well as a second paradox of the predicates that cannot be predicated of themselves. The latter paradox arises out of Russell’s theory of classes and class concepts in Principles of Mathematics.

In early China, views concerning human nature underwent significant development, with philosophers moving from seeing it as desire or instinct to seeing it as virtue or essence. Before Confucius’s time, human beings’ xing, or nature, was construed as desire and instinct, i.e., as a physical nature. The key problem faced by theorists of human nature at that time was how to manage nature with virtue, i.e., how to use virtue to both control and enrich nature. A later, wide-reaching development was the use of qi to explain human nature. Laozi began, taking de or virtue to be the internal essence of the human being; Confucius took de or virtue to be xing or nature. Following this development, the main current of the theory of human nature in the pre-Qin period divided into two branches. One, created by the later Confucius, inherited in part by Zisi, and developed by Mencius, took virtue as nature and insisted on the a priority of internal morality. The other branch, inherited in part by Zisi and developed by the author of Xing Zi Ming Chu and Xunzi, featured the development of the old tradition which took yu, or desire, as nature.

Opposed to a commonly held interpretation that Confucian discourse regarding tianren heyi (天人合一) is simply a human-centred philosophical fusion of humanity and nature, this article argues that the Confucian discourse is in fact composed of two contradictory orientations, one ren-centred (roughly equivalent to “anthropocentric”) and the other tian-centred (“nature-centric” in a specific sense), which generally correspond to the two major camps of environmental philosophy in the West in the twentieth century. It will be further argued that the two orientations of the Confucian view have different yet related functions with regard to environmental protection and conservation: the tian-centred understanding establishes a metaphysical and religious framework for Confucian eco-ethical norms, in which ecological prohibitions and policies are built into the political and religious infrastructure, while the ren-centred orientation adds practical values and meanings to the ontological care of the human relation to the environment. In modern times, the two orientations of Confucian eco-ethics are under further development, moving away from being dualistic philosophies and converging on the eco-ethical way of life. Contemporary Confucians are investigating how the two traditional “orientations” can be unified as one holistic perspective which could provide theoretical and practical guidance for our understanding of the human position in the universe, the harmony between humans and nature, and the value of environmental protection and conservation.

In Western philosophy and psychology, shame is characterized as a self-critical emotion that is often contrasted with the similarly self-critical but morally active emotion of guilt. If shame is negative concern over endangered or threatened self-image (usually in front of others), guilt is autonomous moral awareness of one’s wrongdoings and reparative motivation to correct one’s moral misconduct. Recently, many psychologists have begun to discuss the moral significance of shame in their comparative studies of non-Western cultures. In this new approach, shame is characterized as a positive moral emotion and active motivation for self-reflection and self-cultivation. If shame is a positive and active moral emotion, what is its moral psychological nature? In this paper, I will analyze shame from the perspective of cultural psychology and early Confucian philosophy. Unlike many Western philosophers, Confucius and Mencius discuss shame as a form of moral excellence. In early Confucian texts, shame is not a reactive emotion of an endangered self but a moral disposition that supports a self-critical and self-transformative process of moral development.

The Zhuangzi is a collection of ancient Chinese anecdotes and fables that serves as a foundational Daoist text. The style in which it is written is significant because it obscures rather than reveals the text’s philosophic positions. If the text cannot be translated into plain language while preserving its content, as the Mozi or the Mencius generally can be, then the writing style is not merely rhetorical. The style is itself indispensable to the content. In this study, I analyse a linguistic device mentioned in the Zhuangzi and use it to reflect the text’s writing style—namely, “goblet words” (zhi yan 巵言). I argue that various logical forms of goblet words defy the act of fixing a definite answer in any conceptual distinction or disputation. The forms, which include dilemmatic questions, oxymora and double denial, all serve to preserve indeterminacy. Reading goblet words may affect readers by making them more open-minded towards distinctions. However, readers cannot ascertain that the text’s authors produced this effect intentionally. Therefore, the text may cause readers to be open-minded while the authors remain free of commitment.

In this paper I argue first for a revisionary ontology, that is, for an understanding of “existence” as the property of a field not to be empty. In this context, I distinguish between “metaphysics” (the theory of totality or of fundamental reality) and “ontology” (the systematic investigation into the meaning of “existence”). In the second part, I provide a sketch for a corresponding revisionary theory of the modalities in light of the new ontology proposed.

The philosophy of science and technology and the dialectics of nature enjoy a profound historical origin. The spread and development of dialectics of nature in China have created conditions for discipline institutionalization of the philosophy of science and technology in China. Gradually reaching maturity in the course of reform and opening up, this discipline serves as an important provider of new thinking about China’s social development and a participant in China’s social changes. So far, it has become one of the disciplines with a farreaching impact on contemporary Chinese society and thought. This paper aims at providing a brief and vivid presentation of the history and present situation of Chinese philosophy of science and technology, its development in China, its norms and pluralism as a second-level discipline of philosophy, and some existing problems.

The politics of eco-civilization construction generally involves the understanding and interpretation of ecological civilization, an emerging public policy issue field, from the perspective of political science. Therefore, it can be considered a subfield in comparative politics or issue-based politics. On the other hand, it also encompasses implications in the realm of political philosophy, particularly concerning the relationships between man and nature, economy and environment, individuals and society, as well as domestic and international. The politics of eco-civilization construction drives vital support both in research contents and methods from the established field of environmental politics and its theoretical achievements. Moreover, it goes beyond that foundation by significantly expanding and transforming such aspects as research domains, academic discourses, and subject perspectives. As a result, it can perceptibly depict the distinctive qualitative characteristics of China’s environmental politics in the new era in terms of theory and practice. Under the discourse system of environmental politics, there emerge discussions on political theories of ecoMarxism or eco-socialism, and the ecoMarxism social movements and party politics. These discussions present varying political understandings and public policy responses to the same ecological and environmental issues. However, from the perspective of the politics of ecocivilization construction, the debate and inquiry regarding the socialist qualitative characteristics or political philosophy become a particularly prominent issue, which not only bears relevance to the overall landscape but also shapes future directions.

In keeping with a view that is explicitly formulated by Aristotle in his Motion of Animals, general kinetic principles must be specified according to the different types of movable entities existing in the universe. At issue, essentially, are the motions of the stars and the motions of animals. Whereas the cosmological immovable mover is the object of two complementary analyses (in Bk. VIII of Physics and in Chs. 6 and 7 of Bk. XII of Metaphysics), information on the immovability of the first mover responsible for animal motion is to be found in the psychological and psycho-physiological treatises (On the Soul, in Bk. I, Chs. 3 and 4, and in Bk. III, Ch. 10 and in Ch. 6 of the Motion of Animals). But it is also found in Ch. 7, Bk. XII of the Metaphysics, in the very context of the argument concerning the absolutely first immovable mover of the world. This suggests that the two types of motion, that of the stars and that of animals, however distinct the arguments about them are, rest on a single scheme, and maybe even on a common principle. This is liable to surprise us, as much as stars and animals appear to us to belong to heterogeneous orders of reality. But the situation is different for Aristotle, who, as attentive as he is to differences, tends nonetheless to conceive the stars as living things of a particular kind. This fact is the source of a series of difficulties that Aristotle generously left for his many commentators to solve. Aim of this text, which was initially directed to a larger audience, is to set some of these complex issues in both simple and up to date terms.

I The Confucian Classics and Christian Scriptures speak often about the role “the past” plays in shaping individual and communal character, life, perception, morality and purpose. In both Christianity and classical Confucianism, memory, rite and tradition are each accorded a central place in preserving and interpreting the past as a dynamic force in the present. The first part of this paper studies points of thematic similarity in Christian and Confucian interpretation of memory, rite and tradition. In the second part of the paper, however, critical points of divergence are addressed; for behind the formal similarities lie deeper intellectual, relational and moral differences in understanding the nature and function of “the past” in determining both the present and the future. Comparative literary analysis provides a rich resource for contemporary application of the Confucian Classics and Christian Scriptures to discussion of cultural memory and global harmony. The comparative reading of ‘texts’ also provides an important point of access for understanding the role literature itself plays in determining the form, content and power of memory, ritual and tradition in both Confucianism and Christianity.

With regard to the study of the general history of Chinese philosophy and the creation of a philosophical system, Feng Youlan (Fung Yu-lan) has still not been surpassed in the circle of contemporary Chinese philosophy. His text A History of Chinese Philosophy (in two volumes) has particular value not only because of its description of the history of Chinese philosophy, but also because of its historical linking of antiquity and modernity, and of China and the West, a feat realized through philosophy. His philosophical system, set forth in the Six Books of Zhenyuan貞元六書 (six philosophical monographs) and widely known as the New Learning of Principle system, has ontologically established the primacy of Principle, and, culturally, has instantiated the process of modernization, all of which retains its significance even today. Feng’s thought on realms in his philosophy of life is centered around understanding-based self-enlightenment and has opened a new perspective for reflective thought about, and understanding of, Chinese philosophy. However, it falls short in its failure to acknowledge that “understanding-based self-enlightenment should also be a dynamic process of practice.” Feng showed his academic orientation, distinguished by syncretizing the Learning of Principle and the Learning of Mind, by integrating philosophical creation into the research on the history of philosophy in his late years; however, this syncretism can be pushed further with regard to the issue of unity between subject and object—continuity between the investigation of things before complete understanding and complete enlightenment of the mind after the complete understanding of things. Feng thinks in A Short History of Chinese Philosophy that the most significant contribution that Chinese philosophy has made to the world is in its philosophy of life, and, subsequent to this assertion, one can point out that Chinese philosophy can also make contributions in terms of methodology. In Chinese philosophy, benevolence has an ontological meaning, and is the ontological basis for man and all the other beings to exist in the oneness, as well as the ontological basis for man and the world to be united. Chinese philosophy contains valuable insights in overcoming the opposition between subject and object, establishing a new view of subjects, a new view of objects, and, consequently, creating a new type of subject-object relationship and realizing a second enlightenment of the world.

The 20th century witnessed a strong cultural enlightenment movement in China, starting with the industrialization movement in the late 19th century Qing dynasty (1616–1912) and continuing in the May Fourth movement in 1919. The cultural enlightenment movement was strongly influenced by Western ideas such as democracy and the primacy of science. The Chinese modern cultural enlightenment can be compared with the European enlightenment that began with the Renaissance. One typical characteristic of this Chinese enlightenment that I wish to emphasize is the determining function of ideas and cultures, especially in light of the many criticisms of traditional Confucianism by intellectuals who blamed it for all the failures of Westernization in the 20th century. This is what I call the “Confucian Cultural Fallacy.” This fallacy has influenced many famous intellectuals, such as Tu Wei-ming. In this paper, I set out to analyze how this fallacy influenced Tu in two of his major arguments: the third stage of the Confucian revival movement, and the idea of “cultural China.” Throughout my analysis of different versions of the Confucian cultural fallacy in modern China, I also discuss how best to understand the Chinese cultural enlightenment movement in relation to Western Enlightenment movements.

This article aims to argue that interpreting liangzhi 良知 as innate, original, or cognitive knowledge is likely to fall into “interpretative obfuscation regarding knowledge.” First, for Wang, what is inherent in mankind is moral agency rather than innate or original knowledge. Therefore, the focus of zhizhi 致 知 and gewu 格物 is instead on moral practice and actualization of virtue rather than on either “the extension of knowledge” or “the investigation of things.” Apart from that, drawing support from cognitive knowledge to explicate liangzhi also leads to three related but distinct misconceptions: liangzhi as perfect knowledge, the identity of knowledge and action, and liangzhi as recognition or acknowledgement. By clarifying the above misinterpretations, the meaning and implication of liangzhi will, in turn, also become clearer.

Harmony without uniformity is the wisdom of Chinese civilization. Its connotation remains not only an ethical virtue, a state of being, or a capacity for inclusiveness, but also a methodology of profound philosophical significance. Harmony without uniformity provides us with a Confucian perspective to observe everything, the necessary tools to deal with various complex situations, and a practical path to making moral choices in various situations. Harmony without uniformity contains the cultural genetic code concerning why and how the shared values of humanity are possible, which is one of the significant reasons for the shared values to be actually realized. Harmony without uniformity recognizes inherent differences in the world, diverse demands of cultural forms, and different styles of individuals and communities in beliefs and practices. However, the recognition of differences serves only as one part of the process. Under no circumstances is harmony without uniformity limited to the recognition of “differences” or “diversity.” It also seeks common ground while reserving differences, pursues coexistence and common growth, and contributes to the flourishing of all cultures through coordination, negotiation, and cooperation, thus providing a practical and feasible path for the reconstruction of the shared values of humanity in the new era.

The contrasting approaches to death and bereavement in classical Confucianism and Daoism epitomize the different orientations of the two ethical traditions. Confucianism, here represented by Xunzi, interprets and manages death and bereavement through distinctive cultural practices, specifically rituals and associated norms of propriety, which are intended to bring order, harmony, and beauty to human events and conduct. Daoism, here represented by the Zhuangzi, contextualizes and copes with death and loss through an understanding of and identification with natural processes. Both approaches address death and bereavement through a systematic, naturalistic philosophy of life that makes no appeal to a conception of divinity or a personal afterlife. For Xunzi, the heart of this system is ritual propriety, through which all human affairs—including inevitable, natural events such as death—must be mediated. For the Zhuangzi, by contrast, rigid, ritualized cultural forms are an obstacle to coping efficiently with natural processes such as death. Rather than constructing a sphere of “the human” as distinct from “the natural,” the Zhuangzi urges us to situate the human within nature in a way that removes the opposition between the two. This essay contrasts and critiques the two approaches, contending that although Xunzi’s theory of ritual presents a plausible account of the relation between humanity, culture, and nature, it fails to address death appropriately as an inexorable, natural event. By contrast, the Zhuangzi presents an attractive way of relating human life and death to nature and thus perhaps offers a means of finding solace concerning death. The essay suggests, however, that the Zhuangist stance may be grounded primarily in a certain ethical or aesthetic attitude, rather than in an objectively compelling argument. Ultimately, both approaches may rest as much on contrasting ethical and aesthetic sensibilities as on rational argumentation.

Equilibrium and harmony elevate human emotions like pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy to the highest ontological level. We are puppets of our emotions and feelings, without the possibility of parole. By implanting complex emotional reactions in the operating system of sex robots, we have created a virtual relationship that mimics human intimacy. In this way, a thing—in this case, a machine—takes on human characteristics. This could be called the humanization of things. Not only can things be humanized, humans can also be reified. If, by imitating neural networks and deep learning, intelligent robots are to make great strides in their ability to think, they may come into the possession of emotions and feelings. In traditional Chinese culture, equilibrium and harmony form the highest and most pervasive principle, value, and morality for nature, society, and life. The state of equilibrium (zhong 中 ) and harmony (he 和 ) is the fundamental root from which springs the world and the universal path that it must pursue. When we view emotional equilibrium and harmony in light of the theoretical doctrine of harmony and cooperation, the emotional lives of humans and machines are integrated and combined with the state of equilibrium and harmony to achieve the greatest good. Moreover, this can resolve all kinds of crises amid the emotions and feelings of humanoids created by humans, notably by leveraging the outstanding intelligence of humans to maintain the emotions of humanoids in a state of equilibrium and harmony. To this end, we must perform regulatory actions in several aspects. First, we must modulate emotions and feelings. Second, we must achieve a state of equilibrium, which can put all things in the right positions, allowing them to be nourished and flourish. Third, we must strive for mutual empathy between humans and machines, which can pave the way for collaborative creation in harmony, as well as their integration, camaraderie, emotional understanding, mutual respect and harmonious love.

Clarifying Wang Yangming’s thought through a study of his root metaphors of heart-mind is an important step toward explaining his further concepts of the human world. Along with the root metaphors of water and mirror, the metaphors of plant and light work together for Wang to form a coherent theoretical and practical system of xin (heart-mind). This method is also a good way to unravel the various theories of the “three teachings” that are intermingled in his thinking. By using this methodology Wang’s attempts to harmonize several ancient traditions of heart-mind that appear as possibly polarized to modern readers, are illuminated (though they did not appear contradictory to the Neo-Confucians).

The term xin (心), usually translated as “mind,” “heart” or “heartmind,” is considered a major problématique in traditional Chinese philosophical discourse, and it is usually analized in conjunction with xing (性, human nature). Contemporary scholars consider xin—more or less uncontroversially—as a sort of container of emotions and feelings, or, as On-Cho Ng defines it, “the very home of volition, sentiments and intellect” (Ng 1999). This paper aims to further explore the impact of the physiology of heart (xin) rhetoric within political discourse during the early decades of the Western Han dynasty (206 BC-AD 9). To that end I will first analyze the importance of physiological vocabulary in political argumentation, focusing mainly on the importance of heart (xin), its central role as the ruler of the body, and on the analogy between the heart and the sovereign of the state. I will then analyze the use of the expressions unanimity and duplicity—literally, pitting one heart (yixin 一心) against two hearts (erxin 二心 or liangxin 兩心).

With a focus on The Great Learning (Daxue 大學), this paper explores the specific exegetical or hermeneutical methodology adopted by James Legge in his translation of this Confucian canonical text. It begins with an analysis of the translation theory endorsed by Legge, comparing his translation with those of Ku Hung-ming and Wing-tsit Chan. The second part aims to explicate the hermeneutic dilemma faced by Legge in his dealing with this text. It looks at the intellectual context in which Legge’s scholarship on the Chinese classics had developed, as well as the academic standard he was required to maintain throughout his translation. Overall, Legge’s familiarity with Qing scholarship makes it interesting to determine where and why he follows or rejects Zhu Xi. Given Legge’s Christian missionary background and the sense of mission pervading Zhu Xi’s commentary, we conclude that Legge’s affinity with Zhu Xi is much more subtle and complex than previously speculated: the difference in their approach to Confucian texts cannot be reduced to a contrast between construction and deconstruction or between canonization and decanonization.

The spirit of Confucianism, which holds benevolence as its core value, has positive significance in the dialogue between civilizations and in the construction of global ethics. The values represented in Confucian benevolence are similar to the values in Christian Charity. Confucian values such as the doctrine of magnanimity, the idea of putting oneself in the place of another, and the Confucian way of extending love and favors, are crucial resources to hold in close connection with the relationship between human beings and nature, individuals and society, self and others, and one and oneself. The Confucian idea of “differentiated love” is a concrete and practical idea, which can be extended to be “universal love.” Furthermore, the Confucian way of extending love can also be interpreted as eco-ethical: On the one hand, Confucianism affirms the intrinsic value of the universe and calls for a universal moral concern for the ecological world; on the other hand, it recognizes a distinction between human beings and the nature, revealing an eco-ethical awareness of distinction and a consciousness of the differentiation between different ethical spheres. In extracting the instrumental value of ecological resources, Confucians never disregard the intrinsic value of animals and plants. Confucianism puts emphasis on subjectivity, especially the subjectivity of morality. Relationships between man and himself, between self and others, however, are inter-subjective. For Confucians, the universe exists and grows in the process of perfecting oneself, others, and the world. Such an understanding is of modern significance for the exchange and dialogue between civilizations, and the growth of personality and the mental regulation of gentleman today.

Ecological Marxists argue that Marx forged a view of nature compatible with more recent models of environmentalism. John Bellamy Foster argues that Marx ascribed an ecological value to nature by asserting a co-evolution between man and nature. James O’Connor presents a more nuanced view in which Marx at best defended a conservationist defense of nature. I argue that such ecological views of Marx tend to overlook his abandonment of an ontology of nature as a totality of relations among physical objects with respect to their interactions and mutual preservation and order. He followed Kant in reducing nature, or the physical world, effectively to a regulative notion, thus reducing its value to a simply a heuristic one for judgments about and actions towards objects. But he also radicalized this reduction by envisaging nature only as a material field of fungible and consumable things, such that each thing is a mere locus of energy or force that human labor cannot substantively perfect but only change to a function. Labor in this view creates new arrangements of natural things for a singular ultimate purpose: the formation of associations of free labor. I conclude that Marx’s thinking thus cannot be utilized to support an environmental philosophy, such as deep ecology or eco-socialism, that would posit any intrinsic value to nature.

Since modern times, the comparison of Chinese and Western philosophy has been a fundamental context for all philosophical research in China. Currently, the construction of a contemporary form of Chinese philosophy is currently an urgent task facing the field of Chinese philosophy. Rather than solely focusing on a narrow or direct comparative study of Chinese and Western philosophy, it is important to consider the systematic introduction of Western philosophy and the adaptation of Marxist philosophy to the Chinese context, alongside the extensive study of the history of Chinese philosophy over a century. This historical experience merits further attention and examination. The comparative study of Chinese and Western philosophies has been expanding in-depth, but it is facing a growing predicament. The goal of constructing a contemporary form of Chinese philosophy, incorporating three traditions of Chinese, Western, and Marxist philosophies, has at times appeared to move further away rather than closer. Furthermore, at the turn of the 21st century, it faced the challenge of establishing the “legitimacy” of Chinese philosophy. The crux of the problem lies in questioning the “Chinese characteristics” of the historiography of Chinese philosophy, as well as questioning the “philosophical nature” of Chinese philosophical traditions. To promote meaningful progress in comparison of Chinese and Western philosophies, it is imperative to overcome the dual obsessions of “China-non-philosophy” and “philosophy-non-China,” based on truly grasping the essence of the Western philosophical tradition. Additionally, it is equally important to realize the contemporary development of Marxist philosophical interpretation while engaging in critical dialogue with the latest developments in contemporary Western philosophy and reenact the true spirit of ancient Chinese philosophical traditions in a modern discourse style on the basis of maintaining an appropriate awareness of “distance” between “we” and cultural traditions. This requires looking at and organizing the historical changes in Chinese social life and philosophical trends since modern times, with a future China that has achieved a state of modernization as the reference framework. The development of contemporary Chinese philosophy cannot be accomplished by relying upon a single academic school alone. Rather, it requires a holistic renewal of the academic ecosystem, an inevitable unfolding of the spirit of the new era in all cultural and intellectual domains.

China’s choice of Marxism can be attributed to both historical inevitability and cultural factors. It is crucial to examine the cultural reasons, as Marxism exhibits certain ideological correspondence with Confucianism, a cornerstone of traditional Chinese culture. One notable aspect is the alignment of historical perspectives between Marxism and Confucianism, along with their deep convergence on the concept of freedom. These similarities offer potential cultural possibilities for adapting Marxism to the Chinese context

Confucianists advocate the holistic cosmology of “harmony between humanity and nature and unity of all things,” the ethical pursuit of “loving all people and things and treating them as brothers, sisters and companions,” and the practical guideline of “taking from nature at the proper time and to the proper extent.” These are not only the core values of Confucian ecological culture, but also the concentrated embodiment of Confucian thinking in the ecological field. In the context of the new era, the ecological theory resources in Confucianism can provide ideological resources for reflecting on anthropocentric values. Furthermore, it can provide inspiration and reference for breaking through the bottleneck of environmental ethics, ultimately offering cultural support for the construction of ecological civilization in the new era. Under the guidance of Marxism, we should interpret the ecological cultural view of Confucianism in a modern way, realize the modern transformation of Confucian ecological culture, and advance the construction of ecological civilization in the new era with heightened cultural awareness.

Confucianism defined benevolence with “feelings” and “love.” “Feelings” in Confucianism can be mainly divided into three categories: feelings in general (seven kinds of feelings), love for one’s relatives, and compassion (Four Commencements). The seven kinds of feeling in which people respond to things can be summarized as “likes and dislikes.” The mind responds to things through feelings; based on the mind of benevolence and righteousness or feelings of compassion, the expression of feelings can conform to the principle of the mean and reach the integration of self and others, and of self and external things. The “relations between the seven kinds of feelings and the Four Commencements,” however, was not developed into a theoretical idea in Confucianism. After Confucius, the relationship between the universality of natural sympathies and the gradation of love for relatives gradually became an important subject in Confucian ideas of benevolence and love. By “refuting Yang Zhu and Mozi,” Mencius systematically expounded on this issue. Love had two ends: self-love and natural sympathies, between which existed the love for relatives. These two ends were not the two extremes of Yang’s self-interest and Mozi’s universal love. Love for relatives not only implied a gradation, but also contained universality and transcendence that came from self-love. Love for relatives, natural sympathies and self-love had a kind of tension and connectivity between two dynamic ends. The Confucian idea of benevolence and love hence demonstrated differences and interconnectivity. An accurate understanding of such “feelings” and “love” is important for us to grasp Confucian thoughts on benevolence and its realization.

It is difficult to trace the range of available divinatory numbers from the statistics of digital hexagrams. Now, however, we have definite proofs about the numerical ranges of Shifa (a new unearthed divination method) and about the Dayan divination method (the orthodox divination method of Zhouyi). As Shifa is closely related to Guicang (Reverting to the Hidden, Yi of Shang dynasty), SEVEN could be the key divinatory number in analyzing the numerical range of Guicang. Therefore, relationships among number groups of different divination methods could be distinct. The annotation “It is divined by the fixity of SEVEN and EIGHT of Yi in Xia and Shang dynasties” implies that Jia Gongyan (a famous confucian of the Tang dynasty) had misused the Dayan divination method. It could be certified by the odd-even analysis of Guicang of Qin Bamboo Slip Manuscripts. This study also reveals that the divinatory numbers of unearthed dice correspond to Shifa rather than the original report.

Modern moral and political theorists make a sharp separation between justice and civic friendship, arguing that justice deals with the fair terms of co-operation in the social sphere whereas civic friendship is about an individual’s contingent affections in the political domain. In addition, they also argue that the principles of justice must determine the nature and function of civic friendship in modern liberal society. Even though the historical origin of the above view can be traced to the writings of Immanuel Kant (2007), John Rawls provides us with its most cogent formulation in recent times. In his book A Theory of Justice (1971), Rawls argues that the considerations of right are prior to the considerations of good; therefore the principles of justice must determine the limits of civic friendship. Against Rawls, I argue that justice and civic friendship are intrinsically connected and that they cannot be separated in experience. I draw upon Aristotle’s theory of virtue to strengthen my arguments. Following Aristotle, I show that both justice and friendship are virtues and that all virtues hold together. The Aristotelian coherence of virtues, I argue, can be useful in redefining the obligations of justice and civic friendship in contemporary liberal democracies.

It is argued in this paper that the famous “Active Intellect” of De Anima 3.5 is not God, as Alexander of Aphrodisias held, but rather an unchanging, eternally cognizing Intellect which serves as the indispensable condition for the operation of human intellect. It is “at the door” for each individual, ready to flow in as a stream of light—a light which renders potential objects of cognition knowable, just as visible light makes potentially visible objects visible—from outside that door (thyrathen) any time it is opened. Its existence cannot serve, however, as a proof of the immortality of human intellect, since, being unchanging, it can never possess a feature of human intellect which is characterized by nothing if not change, and that is memory.