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Frontiers of Computer Science

ISSN 2095-2228

ISSN 2095-2236(Online)

CN 10-1014/TP

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2018 Impact Factor: 1.129

Front. Comput. Sci.    2024, Vol. 18 Issue (2) : 182813    https://doi.org/10.1007/s11704-023-3113-x
Information Security
The governance technology for blockchain systems: a survey
Guocheng ZHU1, Debiao HE1,2(), Haoyang AN1, Min LUO1, Cong PENG1
1. School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
2. Shandong Provincial Key Laboratory of Computer Networks, Qilu University of Technology (Shandong Academy of Sciences), Jinan 250014, China
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Abstract

After the Ethereum DAO attack in 2016, which resulted in significant economic losses, blockchain governance has become a prominent research area. However, there is a lack of comprehensive and systematic literature review on blockchain governance. To deeply understand the process of blockchain governance and provide guidance for the future design of the blockchain governance model, we provide an in-depth review of blockchain governance. In this paper, first we introduce the consensus algorithms currently used in blockchain and relate them to governance theory. Second, we present the main content of off-chain governance and investigate two well-known off-chain governance projects. Third, we investigate four common on-chain governance voting techniques, then summarize the seven attributes that the on-chain governance voting process should meet, and finally analyze four well-known on-chain governance blockchain projects based on the previous research. We hope this survey will provide an in-depth insight into the potential development direction of blockchain governance and device future research agenda.

Keywords blockchain governance      off-chain governance      on-chain governance      voting     
Corresponding Author(s): Debiao HE   
About author:

Peng Lei and Charity Ngina Mwangi contributed equally to this work.

Just Accepted Date: 02 August 2023   Issue Date: 17 November 2023
 Cite this article:   
Guocheng ZHU,Debiao HE,Haoyang AN, et al. The governance technology for blockchain systems: a survey[J]. Front. Comput. Sci., 2024, 18(2): 182813.
 URL:  
https://academic.hep.com.cn/fcs/EN/10.1007/s11704-023-3113-x
https://academic.hep.com.cn/fcs/EN/Y2024/V18/I2/182813
Notation Description
IoT Internet of Things
Segwit Segregated Witness
BCH BitcoinCash
BTC Bitcoin
PoW Proof of Work
PoS Proof of Stake
PoA Proof of Activity
PoSe Proof of Service
DKG Distributed key generation
DPoS Delegated Proof of Stake
LPoS Liquid Proof of Stake
TPS Transaction Per Second
EIP Ethereum Improvement Proposal
DKG Distributed Key Generation
CSUG A cryptocurrency system under governance
CSi,i=1,,n The ith well-established cryptocurrency system
GCi,i=1,,m The ith governance smart contract on CSUG
VGi,i=1,,n The voting group on CSi that holds tokens of CSUG
RCi,j,i=1,,n,j=1,,m The registration smart contract on CSi for the voting choices in the governance smart contract GCi
VCi,j,i=1,,n,j=1,,m The voting smart contract on CSi for the governance smart contract GCj
CSCi,i=1,,n The light client of CSi
VCR The vote counting routine
CG The consensus group of CSUG
GPR The governance proposal registry
Tab.1  The symbols used in this paper
Fig.1  The structure of blockchain
Fig.2  Hard fork and soft fork
Launch time Governance type Consensus mechanism Governance feature
Bitcoin [1] 2009 Off-chain PoW Decentralized
Ethereum [2] 2014 Off-chain PoW+PoS Decentralized
Bitshares [22] 2014 On-chain DPoS Representative
Dash [23] 2014 On-chain PoW+PoSe Decentralized
Steemit [24] 2016 On-chain DPoS Representative
Decred [25] 2016 On-chain and off-chain PoA Decentralized
Tezos [26] 2018 On-chain LPoS Representative
EOS [27] 2018 On-chain DPoS Representative
Tab.2  The government type of cryptocurrency
Voting methods Advantages Disadvantages Current use
Proxy voting Professional, flexible high participation Accountability, centralized Tezos, Difinity [30], Bitshares
Quartic voting Professional, reliable high participation Centralized, costly Dursun et al. [31] Gitcoin [32], Kickflow [33]
Cross-chain voting High development speed high participation, Safe Complex, costly MULTAV [34]
Token-lock voting Safe, efficient Deflation Ping Pong [35], Decred
Tab.3  The comparison for four governance voting methods
Fig.3  Proxy voting
Fig.4  Quartic voting
Fig.5  Cross-chain voting
Fig.6  Token-lock voting
Fig.7  EIP category
Fig.8  The attributes of voting in on-chain governance
Fig.9  The framework of MULTAV
Fig.10  Dash governance process
Governance methods On-chain governance Off-chain governance Hybrid governance
Method On-chain voting Off-chain meeting Hybrid
Participants Token holders Core developers, experts Experts (off-chain) Token holders (on-chain)
Advantages Fair Transparent Professional efficient, flexibility Combining both
Disadvantages Low participation Low efficiency, Variability High centralization untransparent Immaturity
Main goal Modify consensus mechanism and some governance detail Formulate overall direction of blockchain development Overall all governance issues of blockchain
Tab.4  The comparison about three governance methods
Fig.11  Decred governance model
Tezos MULTAV Dash Decred (on-chain part)
Accountability Partially satisfied Yes No No
Incentives Partially satisfied Partially satisfied Yes Partially satisfied
Decision-making Decentralized Decentralized Centralized Decentralized
Authentication Partially satisfied Yes No No
Anonymity No Same as the chosen blockchain Yes Yes
Coercion freeness No N/A No Yes
Auditability Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tab.5  The analysis of four on-chain governance blockchain
  
  
  
  
  
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