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Frontiers of Electrical and Electronic Engineering

ISSN 2095-2732

ISSN 2095-2740(Online)

CN 10-1028/TM

Front Elect Electr Eng Chin    2010, Vol. 5 Issue (4) : 482-487    https://doi.org/10.1007/s11460-010-0095-x
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Security research with Square attack to a variant Camellia cipher
Xiangyang XU1(), Guangsheng ZHANG2
1. Department of Computer Science and Technology, Changsha University, Changsha 410003, China; 2. School of Computer, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China
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Abstract

This paper investigates the relation between the choice of S-boxes and Square attack. A variant Camellia, which uses only a single S-box instead of four, is proposed. The security of the variant Camellia against Square attack is studied in detail. Result shows that it needs only 28 chosen plaintexts to recover a byte of the 6th round-key of variant Camellias, while the original Camellia needs either 28 chosen plaintexts to recover a byte of the 6th round-key and a byte of some constant or 216 chosen plaintexts to recover a byte of the 6th round-key. Furthermore, Square attacks on other round-reduced variant Camellia are proposed, and the time complexity of 11-round attack is reduced from 2250 to 2225.5. The weaker variant Camellia indicates that the choice of S-box and the order of different S-boxes have influence on Square attack.

Keywords block cipher      Camellia      Square attack     
Corresponding Author(s): XU Xiangyang,Email:xxy@ccsu.cn   
Issue Date: 05 December 2010
 Cite this article:   
Xiangyang XU,Guangsheng ZHANG. Security research with Square attack to a variant Camellia cipher[J]. Front Elect Electr Eng Chin, 2010, 5(4): 482-487.
 URL:  
https://academic.hep.com.cn/fee/EN/10.1007/s11460-010-0095-x
https://academic.hep.com.cn/fee/EN/Y2010/V5/I4/482
Fig.1  Square attack on 6-round Camellia*
AttackroundsdatatimeSource
Camellia6256256Ref. [10].
Camellia629.6218Ref. [11].
Camellia*629210.4Sect. 4.1
Camellia7258.3280.2Ref. [10].
Camellia7226.8233.5Ref. [11].
Camellia*7217.6219.2Sect. 4.2
Camellia11284.82250Ref. [11].
Camellia*11252.92225.5Sect. 4.3
Tab.1  Square attack on Camellia and Camellia*
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