A new statute, “Hiding New and Old Fugitive Slaves of Manchus,” was added to the first version of the Qing code in 1647, and this statute surprisingly regulated that any offenders would be excluded from any amnesties. This is especially noteworthy because, according to both Ming and Qing codes, only severe crimes, such as treason and rebellion, were excluded from any amnesties. Previous scholars have not considered why the statute excluded any amnesties, nor have they analyzed how this amnesty policy was implemented in practice. This article contends that the exclusion did not arise from Manchu tradition. Instead, it was an exceptional response to the norms of amnesties in the Ming and Qing codes. Because the fugitive problem, involving slaves of Manchus fleeing from the banner system, endangered Manchus’ interests, the Qing court was compelled to exclude fugitive criminals from amnesties. However, the Qing court did not strictly apply the amnesty policy of this statute. Criminals in fugitive cases were sometimes pardoned because of amnesties during the Dorgon regency period. Dorgon, Shunzhi, Oboi, and Kangxi all initially excluded those harboring fugitives from amnesties, but later changed their amnesty policies in this regard. Even though the crime of harboring fugitives became a permanent symbol of Manchu rule and was recorded in every emperor’s enthronement edict from Kangxi to Xuantong, the Qing court gradually came to accept norms concerning amnesties as practiced in Han society and treated fugitive cases as ordinary court cases during and after the Kangxi emperor’s reign.

Envisioning a well-ordered society composed of filial subjects who obeyed the law, avoided disputes, shunned religious heresy, paid their taxes, and peacefully engaged in agriculture, the Kangxi emperor’s “Sacred Edict of Sixteen Maxims” (圣谕十六条) has often been considered a declaration of the alien Qing dynasty’s Confucian bona fides. While the rhetoric of the pronouncement echoed traditional moral values, the political acumen of the Qing rulers was readily apparent in the eighth maxim, “explain the laws to warn the ignorant and obstinate.” Melding moral and legal education, the eighth maxim specifically endorsed the efficacy of the law. The importance placed on legal knowledge was abundantly clear in one of the earliest commentaries, which explained all sixteen maxims with examples of applicable legal guidelines. Thus, the “Sacred Edict” was a shrewd maneuver that endorsed traditional moral values, but it also foreshadowed a “legislative turn” in the Qing rule that was discernible in the evolving ethos of criminal justice. Despite the extensive efforts to propagate the “Sacred Edict,” violent crime was on the rise in the Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong reigns. When transformation through moral “teaching and cultivation” (jiaoyang 教养) failed to alleviate social conflict, Qing rulers reconsidered and revised the established practice of criminal justice and the existing concept of criminal behavior. By the end of the eighteenth century, the effort to stem the tide of violent crime relied less on ideological exhortation and more on legislation that articulated harsh punishments. This “legislative turn” in Qing criminal justice resulted in an aggressive policy of deterrence that facilitated the greater use of capital punishment.

Institutional reform and social changes in northeast China during the late Qing period are usually attributed to the Qing dynasty changing its policy on immigration to northeast China. However, institutional reform because of debt appeals between civilian creditors and the Mongolian princes is often overlooked. Using administrative cases from Fengtian Governor Archives and Kirin Prefecture Archives, this study identifies how the governor officers of northeast China changed Mongolian land rights and official finance institutions through appeal judgments in the late Qing dynasty. Appeals were related to Mongolian land rights reform and promoted the financial institutional reform in northeast China. This study concludes by arguing that the judgments affected the profits of the litigants and changed the local society.

During the Beiyang period of the early Republic of China, the re-trial system覆判 referred to the practice where cases considered by the county magistrate had to be sent to the provincial high court for re-trial to ensure that the case facts were true, the law was correctly applied, and the penalties were appropriate. The scope of the re-trial cases continuously expanded from 1912 to 1922 and, finally, the Amendment to the Statutes on the Re-trial System in 1922 stipulated that all cases under the jurisdiction of the district courts where county magistrates tried, whether through appeal or re-trial, had to be re-tried by the high court or its branches. The adjustment of the scope of the re-trial cases was closely related to the extent to which the county magistrates’ judicial discretion was restricted. During the Beiyang period, due to the failure to establish formal courts of the first instance in counties throughout the country, the county magistrates concurrently handled judicial affairs, which inevitably caused the magistrates’ judicial discretion. The re-trial system was originally designed to compensate for the drawbacks of county magistrates managing judicial affairs and to facilitate the transition within the judicial system. However, the interpretation of the role of the re-trial system should not be limited to reconciliation and adaptation of the old and new judicial systems in the Beiyang period but also to compensate for the deficiencies of county magistrates’ judgments by continuously improving the re-trial procedure and to ensure the fairness of justice through restrictions on the judicial discretion of county magistrates, the enjoyment of equality of procedures, and the establishment of supervision procedures.

The doctrine of building “a human community with a shared future” (HCSF) is a Chinese diplomatic strategy in the new era moving closer to the center of global affairs. It includes enriched ideas about international law and the essential elements of institutionalization. The emergence and development of modern international law have revealed the critical importance of the ideas about international law as guidance for institutions. It is necessary and possible to institutionalize the HCSF by setting its ideas as principles of international law. The principles of international law for the HCSF are those of durable peace, universal security, common prosperity, coexistence of different civilizations, and sustainable development. The new five principles of the HCSF are integrated with the existing general principles of international law and Chinese proposals for the new era, which is not only the development of Chinese-initiated Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence but also a new contribution to the contemporary international law. It will be the new guidance to advance the profound changes of international relations unseen in a century for the common interest of mankind.