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Paradoxes in the Textual Development of the Laozi: A Closer Examination of Chapters Eight and Twenty-Four
CUI Xiaojiao
Frontiers of Philosophy in China. 2017, 12 (3): 393-407.
https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-006-017-0029-8
In light of the recently published Western Han period bamboo-slip Laozi, now in the collection of Peking University, this paper explores several paradoxes in the textual development of the Laozi. Specifically, it presents two examples suggesting that since the wording in the Laozi was originally intended to be ambiguous and paradoxical, during the transmission of the text, the compilers or commentators modified some of the paradoxes to make better sense. Eventually those modifications came to replace the original text. In the first part of this article examines certain contrasting differences in Chapter Eight from the Beida Laozi, the Mawangdui Laozi, and the received Laozi. The second part, I examine certain other contrasting differences from these same versions from Chapter Twenty-Four are discussed. This paper argues that these differences among the various versions are not the product of transcribal error; rather, they are the result of compilers or commentators who revised these passages against their earliest versions in order to make the meaning clearer and more explicit.
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Ontology and Metaphysics in Chinese Philosophy
ZHENG Kai
Frontiers of Philosophy in China. 2017, 12 (3): 408-428.
https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-006-017-0030-2
This paper begins with a critique of the uses of the term “bentilun 本 體論 (ontology)” in modern Chinese scholarship by tracing their claim to being theoretical paradigms for understanding Chinese philosophy as a philosophical tradition. It is supplemented by a contrastive discussion of bentilun and its original ancient Greek counterpart, i.e. ontology, to show that the object of discourse in bentilun does not match up with that of ontology, namely “being qua being.” This comparative study also demonstrates that bentilun finds its philosophical significance in connection with the theory of xinxing 心性 (heart-mind). In the second section of this paper, a comparative study of “xingershangxue 形而上學 (metaphysics)” and “metaphysics” highlights the central tenet that the dao essentially transcends language. Daoist philosophy is used as an example that identifies a unique predilection toward philosophical concepts that transcend the realm of nameable thoughts and objects in Chinese philosophy. Textual evidence is provided to show that the conceptual possibility of xingershangxue is based upon a fundamental difference between you 有 (being) and wu 無 (not-being), in a way that is similar to philosophical developments in other early civilizations. Nonetheless, in addition to a philosophical interest in principles and values that transcend the material world, Daoist xingershangxue exhibits an idiosyncratic attention to notions and theories whose object of discourse is essentially unnameable. This characteristic philosophical interest is identified with the aim of locating essential disciplines within Chinese philosophy, including the theory of xinxing, practical wisdom, and the theory of jingjie 境界 (state-of-attainment) in a wider framework of east and west philosophical traditions.
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Love and the Paradoxes of Unity: Zhu Xi’s Debate with Followers of Cheng Hao over “Perceptual Oneness”
ZHENG Zemian
Frontiers of Philosophy in China. 2017, 12 (3): 429-449.
https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-006-017-0031-9
At the end of the twentieth century, there was a trend in Chinese literature towards characterizing Chinese culture as the “unity of Tian (Heaven) and humanity 天人合一.” Rather than arguing against such a view, I present in this paper a series of debates over the paradoxes within the concept of unity as well as various notions of love, hoping to demonstrate the depth and complexity of this seemingly simple and dogmatic dictum so that those who cite it can be alert to its potential intricacies. I will discuss three elements which threaten to render the pursuit of oneness an impossible project: (1) the relation between naming and the named, which makes any conceptual attempt to attain oneness an infinite regress, as can be seen in Zhuangzi’s 莊子 argument against Hui Shi’s 惠施 oneness; (2) the gap between contemplation and practice, as can be seen in the contrast between Zhang Zai’s 張載 contemplative oneness and Cheng Hao’s 程顥 perceptual oneness; and (3) the self-bifurcating attentive acts of the heart-mind, which render any conscious endeavor to attain oneness a self-defeating project. Unlike Cheng Hao’s emphasis on the subjective experience of perceptual oneness, his followers posit its underlying metaphysical substance as qi or xing (nature) and believe that moral self-cultivation should start from a metaphysical insight into this substance. Zhu Xi 朱熹 rejects the approach of grounding ethics on metaphysics and argues that love is not based on the notion of unity in terms of qi. He sees the ultimate comprehension of unity rather as a “metaphysical promise,” a goal to be attained by following the Confucian Way of selfcultivation, which starts simply from reflection and practice on things near at hand.
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Liangzhi and the Interpretative Obfuscation Regarding Knowledge
CHANG Tzu-li
Frontiers of Philosophy in China. 2017, 12 (3): 450-465.
https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-006-017-0032-6
This article aims to argue that interpreting liangzhi 良知 as innate, original, or cognitive knowledge is likely to fall into “interpretative obfuscation regarding knowledge.” First, for Wang, what is inherent in mankind is moral agency rather than innate or original knowledge. Therefore, the focus of zhizhi 致 知 and gewu 格物 is instead on moral practice and actualization of virtue rather than on either “the extension of knowledge” or “the investigation of things.” Apart from that, drawing support from cognitive knowledge to explicate liangzhi also leads to three related but distinct misconceptions: liangzhi as perfect knowledge, the identity of knowledge and action, and liangzhi as recognition or acknowledgement. By clarifying the above misinterpretations, the meaning and implication of liangzhi will, in turn, also become clearer.
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