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Frontiers of Philosophy in China

ISSN 1673-3436

ISSN 1673-355X(Online)

CN 11-5743/B

Postal Subscription Code 80-983

Front. Philos. China    2015, Vol. 10 Issue (2) : 298-310    https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-004-015-0022-1
research-article |
On Kripke’s Dogmatism Paradox: A Logical Dynamical Analysis
XU Zhaoqing()
Department of Philosophy, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China
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Abstract

As a byproduct of solving the surprise-exam paradox, Saul Kripke formulates a “dogmatism paradox” which seems to show that knowledge entails dogmatism. In this paper, the author analyzes the nature of the dogmatism paradox from a logical dynamical perspective. The author suggests that the dogmatism paradox is better understood as a paradox of knowledge attribution rather than of knowledge. Therefore, the dogmatism paradox could be solved without sacrificing the principle of epistemic closure. Based on a famous version of relevant alternatives theory, the author formalizes a logic of knowledge attribution in the style of logical dynamics, namely, public retraction logic, and analyzes how knowledge attributions are retracted with the expansion of relevant alternatives.

Keywords dogmatism paradox      epistemic closure      knowledge attribution      relevant alternatives      public retraction logic     
Issue Date: 19 June 2015
 Cite this article:   
XU Zhaoqing. On Kripke’s Dogmatism Paradox: A Logical Dynamical Analysis[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2015, 10(2): 298-310.
 URL:  
http://academic.hep.com.cn/fpc/EN/10.3868/s030-004-015-0022-1
http://academic.hep.com.cn/fpc/EN/Y2015/V10/I2/298
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