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Liquidity Shock, Credit Constraint and the Development of Private vs. State-Owned Enterprises
Qing Shi, Chen Wang, Wei Wang
Frontiers of Economics in China. 2019, 14 (4): 583-603.
https://doi.org/10.3868/s060-008-019-0023-5
Based on firm level data for the period of 1998–2007, this paper attempts to explain the growth differences between private enterprises and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China, in the context of liquidity shocks, and institutional and financial environments. It is found that (1) when liquidity tightens, the private enterprises face stricter credit constraints than SOEs, which restricts the development of private enterprise; (2) when liquidity becomes abundant, private enterprises face fewer financial limitations and grow much faster than SOEs; (3) the effect of liquidity shocks on the growth rate gap between private enterprises and SOEs has weakened during the period 2002–2007. These findings reveal that the credit discrimination against private enterprises can be mitigated by improving institutional and financial environments, which weaken the effects of liquidity shocks on firm growth.
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Project Matching and Overcapacity in China
Lixue Wu, Cheng Liu
Frontiers of Economics in China. 2019, 14 (4): 629-669.
https://doi.org/10.3868/s060-008-019-0025-9
Based on the features of China’s project investment, we consider the formation of production capacity as a matching behavior between local governments and investment enterprises. Using the search and matching model, we illustrate that the excess capacity in China mainly results from the asymmetry between the gains from and contribution to the project matching: The capacity will be excessive when the proportion of local governments’ return exceeds its contribution to the project, and the more unbalanced the return–contribution relationship, the more severe the overcapacity. Meanwhile, we test this theoretical prediction based on a quasi-natural experiment: the reform of administrative approval system. The empirical results show that the reduction of the local governments’ return–contribution ratio will significantly raise the capacity utilization rate and mitigate the overcapacity. Industry-specific regression results further indicate that governments’ return–contribution asymmetry is more prominent in industries dominated by state-owned enterprises, high-monopoly industries, heavy industries, and industries with serious overcapacity. This paper offers a novel mechanism of overcapacity, a theoretical criterion for judging optimal capacity, and some new regulatory tools with the micro foundation.
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