Wittgenstein’s reconsideration of the transcendental problem —With some remarks on the relation between Wittgenstein’s “phenomenology” and Husserl’s phenomenology
Wittgenstein’s reconsideration of the transcendental problem —With some remarks on the relation between Wittgenstein’s “phenomenology” and Husserl’s phenomenology
ZHANG Qingxiong
Department of Philosophy, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China;
The transcendental problem that obsessed the great Western philosophers such as Kant and Husserl should be, according to Wittgenstein, conceived as a matter of understanding a process of reasoning in which a conclusion follows necessarily from stated rules. Once these rules, regarded as a priori categories by Kant and as eidos and eidetic relations by Husserl, are demonstrated to be no more than the language usages or rules of language-games related to our forms of life, Kant’s transcendental idealism and Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology no longer have a leg to stand on.
. Wittgenstein’s reconsideration of the transcendental problem —With some remarks on the relation between Wittgenstein’s “phenomenology” and Husserl’s phenomenology[J]. Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 2008, 3(1): 123-138.
ZHANG Qingxiong. Wittgenstein’s reconsideration of the transcendental problem —With some remarks on the relation between Wittgenstein’s “phenomenology” and Husserl’s phenomenology. Front Phil Chin, 2008, 3(1): 123-138.
