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Frontiers of Computer Science

ISSN 2095-2228

ISSN 2095-2236(Online)

CN 10-1014/TP

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Front Comput Sci Chin    2010, Vol. 4 Issue (2) : 212-219    https://doi.org/10.1007/s11704-010-0511-7
RESEARCH ARTICLE
N-person credibilistic strategic game
Rui LIANG1, Yueshan YU2, Jinwu GAO3(), Zhi-Qiang LIU4
1. School of Economics and Finance, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Shaanxi 710049, China; 2. Department of Mathematical Sciences, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China; 3. School of Information, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China; 4. School of Creative Media, City University of HongKong, Hong Kong, China
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Abstract

This paper enlarges the scope of fuzzy-payoff game to n-person form from the previous two-person form. Based on credibility theory, three credibilistic approaches are introduced to model the behaviors of players in different decision situations. Accordingly, three new definitions of Nash equilibrium are proposed for n-person credibilistic strategic game. Moreover, existence theorems are proved for further research into credibilistic equilibrium strategies. Finally, two numerical examples are given to illustrate the significance of credibilistic equilibria in practical strategic games.

Keywords fuzzy variable      credibility measure      strategic game      credibilistic equilibrium     
Corresponding Author(s): GAO Jinwu,Email:jgao@ruc.edu.cn   
Issue Date: 05 June 2010
 Cite this article:   
Yueshan YU,Jinwu GAO,Zhi-Qiang LIU, et al. N-person credibilistic strategic game[J]. Front Comput Sci Chin, 2010, 4(2): 212-219.
 URL:  
https://academic.hep.com.cn/fcs/EN/10.1007/s11704-010-0511-7
https://academic.hep.com.cn/fcs/EN/Y2010/V4/I2/212
Fig.1  An NCSG with two players
Fig.1  An NCSG with two players
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