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Frontiers of Computer Science

ISSN 2095-2228

ISSN 2095-2236(Online)

CN 10-1014/TP

Postal Subscription Code 80-970

2018 Impact Factor: 1.129

Front. Comput. Sci.    2019, Vol. 13 Issue (2) : 333-342    https://doi.org/10.1007/s11704-017-6102-0
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Optimal bundles for sponsored search auctions via bracketing scheme
Zheng-Dong XIA, Tian-Ming BU(), Wen-Hui GONG
Shanghai Key Laboratory of Trustworthy Computing, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200233, China
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Abstract

Sponsored search auction has been recently studied and auctioneer’s revenue is an important consideration in probabilistic single-item second-price auctions. Some papers have analyzed the revenue maximization problem on different methods to bundle contexts. In this paper, we propose a more flexible and natural method which is called the bracketing method. We prove that finding a bracketing scheme that maximizes the auctioneer’s revenue is strongly NP-hard. Then, a heuristic algorithm is given. Experiments on three test cases show that the revenue of the optimal bracketing scheme is very close to the optimal revenue without any bundling constraint, and the heuristic algorithm performs very well. Finally, we consider a simpler model that for each row in the valuation matrix, the non-zero cells have the same value. We prove that the revenue maximization problem with K-anonymous signaling scheme and cardinality constrained signaling scheme in this simpler model are both NP-hard.

Keywords sponsored search auction      revenue maximization      bracketing scheme      NP-hardness     
Corresponding Author(s): Tian-Ming BU   
Just Accepted Date: 14 April 2017   Online First Date: 25 May 2018    Issue Date: 08 April 2019
 Cite this article:   
Zheng-Dong XIA,Tian-Ming BU,Wen-Hui GONG. Optimal bundles for sponsored search auctions via bracketing scheme[J]. Front. Comput. Sci., 2019, 13(2): 333-342.
 URL:  
https://academic.hep.com.cn/fcs/EN/10.1007/s11704-017-6102-0
https://academic.hep.com.cn/fcs/EN/Y2019/V13/I2/333
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