Process safety management considerations for biofuel production

doi:10.15302/J-FEM-2017025

Front. Eng

2017, Vol. 4

Issue (3) : 357-367 https://doi.org/10.15302/J-FEM-2017025

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Process safety management considerations for biofuel production

Hao WU, Igor PEÑARRUBIA, Lin CUI, Jinsong ZHAO(

)

Department of Chemical Engineering, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China

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Abstract

The global production of bio-based chemical products, particularly biofuel products, has tremendously increased over the last decade. Driven largely by a new legislation, this increase has generated the commercialization of new products and processes. Unfortunately, alongside these developments were a significant number of accidents and explosions at biofuel facilities, entailing property damage, injury, and even deaths. The aim of this current study is to draw attention to incidents that occurred in biofuel facilities and clarify the misconceptions that cause people to ignore safety in bio-refineries. A process hazard analysis (PHA) method, namely the hazard and operability study (HAZOP), is first used in biofuel production. This method is an ethanol distillation and dehydration process. Through the HAZOP analysis, 36 recommended action items are proposed, and all recommendations are accepted. The case study reveals that potential high-level risks exist in the current biofuel process design and operating procedures, and these risks can be better controlled if they can be previously identified.

Keywords biofuel HAZOP PHA risk management

Corresponding Author(s): Jinsong ZHAO

Just Accepted Date: 29 August 2017 Online First Date: 26 September 2017 Issue Date: 30 October 2017

Cite this article:

Hao WU,Igor PEÑARRUBIA,Lin CUI, et al. Process safety management considerations for biofuel production[J]. Front. Eng, 2017, 4(3): 357-367.

URL:

https://academic.hep.com.cn/fem/EN/10.15302/J-FEM-2017025
https://academic.hep.com.cn/fem/EN/Y2017/V4/I3/357

Fig.1 (a) Accidents per billion barrels produced (Petroleum refinery vs. Ethanol); (b) Accidents per billion barrels produced (Petroleum refinery vs. Biodiesel)

Fig.2 (a) Flowchart of the HAZOP study procedure adapted from (IEC, 2001); (b) Flowchart of the HAZOP examination procedure adapted from (IEC, 2001)

Fig.3 Simplified biofuel ethanol distillation and dehydration process

Tab.1 Main equipment and control loops

Fig.4 (a) Statistics result of HAZOP study; (b) Risk matrix; (c) Results of estimated risks

Node	Deviation	Deviation Description	Causes	Consequences	S	L	R	Safeguards	Recommendations
1	Crack	The heat exchanger in the inlet pipeline of T-28 cracked	The heat exchanger E-17 inner leak	The feedstock will be blended with the production, the process must be shutdown	5	3	III	The operation procedure rules the production must be rechecked every 2h
1	Pressure high	The pressure of T-28 is too high	The temperature of the cool water in the condenser on the T-28’s top is too high	The T-28 outlet gas'rsquo;s temperature is too high. The following condenser’s capability may be insufficient. The amount of the final production reduces up to 10%	2	5	III		3. The cooling public utilities should be expanded
1	Leakage	The reboiler E-15 leakage	The reboiler E-15 inner leaks	1. The gas in T-28 leaks to the liquid. The production is lost partly 2. The heat will be wasted	5	4	IV	The operation procedure rules the production must be rechecked every 2h
1	No flow	The reboiler E-15 flowrate is zero	1. Power failure 2. The E-15’s feed pump P-25 is damaged	The reboiler E-15 is over heated, result in blockage or coking	5	3	III
2	Level low	T-32 aldehyde removing column	The T-32 outlet pump P-30s flow rate is too high due to its outlet control value widely opened on error or the public utility’s faults. The level of column T-32 is decreased down to zero.	The pump P-30 is empty, resulting in temperature raising. The potential fire and blasting hazard exists due to the high temperature	5	3	III	The pump has a output pressure indicator PT-17	2. Add an interlock: Stop the P-30A/B when the T-32’s level is too low
3	No flow	Heat exchanger E-06’s flow rate in tube pass (Dilute alcohol)	1. The manual valve on T-03’s outlet pipe is closed by mistake. (In maintenance or startup/shutdown phase) 2. Feed-in pump P-30 failure 3. The manual valve on E-06’s outlet pipe is closed by mistake. (In maintenance or startup/shutdown phase)	1. E-06 or its accessory flanges are damaged by over pressure. Ethanol leakage will result in fire or explosion hazards 2. Refer to the consequences of the T-03’s temp-high deviation	5	4	IV		4. Add an interlock system to shut pump P-30 down when its outlet pressure is too high 5. Confirm that the manual valves are timely opened in the maintenance, startup and shutdown operating procedures
3	No flow	Heat exchanger E-06’s flow rate in shell pass (Hot water)	1. The control valve on water line malfunction 2. The level controller on V-01 malfunction	T-03’s temperature decreases rapidly, which will result in process shutdown	4	3	III		6. The V-01 has a twin backup vessel V-01B having its own level controller. The control strategy of the level controller on V-01 and V-01B should be changed to 2oo2
3	Temperature low	T-03’s Temperature is too low	1. Inlet flowrate is too high, refer to T-28’s deviation–flow high 2. The steam, feed into E-16, flowrate control valve PV-52 closed by fault 3. the steam pressure controller PT-52 closed by fault 4. The instrument-air failed	The steam feed into the T-03 through PV-52 is the main heat source of this process. Therefore, if the steam is failed, the whole process must be shutdown	5	3	III		16. Inquire the instruments department, apply an auto switch system on the instrument-air compressor 17. Enforce the maintenance on PV-52 and PT-52, which should be added in the operation procedure
3	Temperature high	T-03’s Temperature is too High	The steam, feed into E-02, pressure controller PT-52 opened by fault	The pressure of T-03 raised rapidly, the column may cracks	5	2	III		7. Add a control loop, control the inlet steam flowrate by T-03’s pressure or temperature 10. Add relief valve on T-03
3	Temperature high	T-03’s Temperature is too High	The heat exchanger E-15/19’s efficiency decreased after long time working	T-03’s top reflux is insufficient, then T-03’s pressure increases, which make a positive feedback loop, resulting in the temperature and pressure increasing continuously	2	5	III		7. Add a control loop, control the inlet steam flowrate by T-03’s pressure or temperature
3	Level high	T-03’s bottom level	The T-03’s bottom level controller frozen in winter	The column T-03 is flooded	2	5	III	Insulating cover is applied	8. Add some insulating measures against the frozen, such as heat tracing on the level control pipe lines 9. Add another different type instruments for generating level high alarm
3	Level low	The level on vessel V-08 is too low	The control valve on the P-31’s outlet is widely opened by fault	The pump P-31 is empty, resulting in temperature raising. The potential fire and blasting hazard exists due to the high temperature	5	4	IV		12. Add an interlock: Stop the P-31 when the V-08’s level is too low
3	Level low	The level on vessel V-08 is too low	The level controller on V-08 fault	No reflux to T-03, the temperature and pressure of T-03 increased (Refer to the T-03’s temperature high deviation)	4	3	III
4	Pressure high	T-11’s pressure is too high	The auxiliary steam valve is opened by operator’s mistake	Over-pressure results in the column leakage or pipeline leakages, may result in fire or blasting	5	3	III		14. Add a relief valve on the distillation column T-11
4	Level low	T-11’s bottom level is too low	The level control valve is opened by fault, or by instrument-air failure	The heat exchanger E-09 is over heated, result in blockage or coking	5	4	IV	Level low alarm exists	19. Add an interlock: Stop P-21 when the T-11 level is too low
5	Temperature low	T-21’s temperature is too low	The steam control valve is closed due to the steam feed in controller failure, or by instrument-air failure	Temperature decreased, much more ethanol is pumped out through the waste fluid pipeline. Ethanol lost	5	3	III		16. Inquire the instruments department, apply an auto switch system on the instrument-air compressor
5	Temperature high	T-21’s temperature is too high	The heat exchanger E-17’s efficiency decreased after long time working	No reflux to T-21, the temperature and pressure of T-21 increased	2	5	III
5	Level high	T-21’s bottom level is too high	The T-03’s bottom level controller frozen in winter	The column T-21 is flooded, the process must be shutdown	2	5	III		8. Add some insulating measures against the frozen, such as heat tracing on the level control pipe lines 9. Add another different type instruments for generating level high alarm
5	Level high	T-21’s bottom level is too high	Pump P-19 failed	T-21 will serious flood. Furthermore the T-21 may be damaged due to the liquid weight	5	2	III		29. Enforce the maintenance and routing inspection on P-19
5	Leakage	E-17 inner leakage	E-17 inner leakage	Feedstock blends with the production gas, result in the increase of COD. The cost of waste water treatment will increase	5	4	IV	The operation procedure rules the production must be rechecked every 2 h
5	Level low	V-24’s Level is too low	The control valve on the P-20s outlet is widely opened by failure	The pump P-20 is empty, resulting in temperature raising. The potential fire and blasting hazard exists due to the high temperature	5	4	IV		25. Add an interlock: Stop P-20 when the V-24 level is too low
5	Level low	V-24’s Level is too low	The level controller on V-24 failed	No reflux to T-21, the temperature and pressure of T-21 increased(Refer to the T-21’s temperature high deviation)	4	3	III

Tab.2 HAZOP results with risk level III and IV

Recommendations	Type
1. Enforce the maintenance management	2
2. Add an interlock: Stop the P-30A/B when the T-32’s level is too low	4
3. The cooling public utilities should be expanded	3
4. Add an interlock system to shut pump P-30 down when its outlet pressure is too high	4
5. Confirm that the manual valves are timely opened in the maintenance, startup and shutdown operating procedures	1
6. The V-01 has a twin backup vessel V-01B having its own level controller. The control strategy of the level controller on V-01 and V-01B should be changed to 2oo2	4
7. Add a control loop, control the inlet steam flowrate by T-03’s pressure or temperature	4
8. Add some insulating measures against the frozen, such as heat tracing on the level control pipe lines	3
9. Add another different type instruments for generating level high alarm	4
10. Add relief valve on T-03	3
11. Add a flammable gas alarm near the E-26’s vent outlet	4
12. Add an interlock: Stop the P-31 when the V-08’s level is too low	4
13. Add a interlock: close the steam valve P53 when T-11’s temperature is too high	4
14. Add a relief valve on the distillation column T-11	3
15. Enforce the management, ensure the inspection without break	2
16. Inquire the instruments department, apply an auto switch system on the instrument-air compressor	4
17. Enforce the maintenance on PV-52 and PT-52, which should be added in the operation procedure	1
18. Add a warm measures on the level controller LIT-803	3
19. Add an interlock: Stop P-21 when the T-11 level is too low	4
20. Add a flammable gas alarm near the E-36’s vent outlet	4
21. Change the TV-18 from air-to-open to air-to-close	4
22. Add routing verification on TV-118 in operation procedure	1
23. Add suit equipment (vessel, column, etc.) for absorption	3
24. Add routing verification on TV-120 in operation procedure	1
25. Add an interlock: Stop P-20 when the V-24 level is too low	4
26. Add more maintenance actions on PV-043, should be added in the operation procedure	1
27. Add a control loop: control the steam feed in by T-21’s pressure or temperature	4
28. Add more maintenance actions on PT-034,35	2
29. Enforce the maintenance and routing inspection on P-19	2
30. Add a warm measures on the level controller LIT-805	3
31. Add an interlock: Stop P-59 when the FIT-98’s flowrate is zero	4
32. Add more labor on the T-01’s supervisor controlling	2
33. Add an online hygrometer in the E-07’s outlet pipeline	4
34. Enforce the inspection on the pump P-79	1
35. Build a dam around the V-78	3
36. Add an interlock: Stop P-79 when the FIT-74’s flowrate is zero	4

Tab.3 Recommendation list

Tab.4 Summary of the recommendations

Fig.5 Main user interface of PSMSuite^®

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