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Max Scheler’s Phenomenology of Pain
Saulius Geniusas
Front. Philos. China. 2016, 11 (3): 358-376.
https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-005-016-0027-0
This paper offers a systematic account of Scheler’s phenomenology of pain, addresses its place in the history of the phenomenology of pain and traces its significance for pain research. Against the popular view, which maintains that for Scheler pain is a feeling-state, this paper argues that Scheler conceives of pain as an irreducibly ambiguous phenomenon: as both a non-intentional feeling-state and an intentional feeling. This paper further shows how this ambiguity leads Scheler to qualify pain as a stratified phenomenon, composed of causal, sensory, emotive and cognitive dimensions. This paper demonstrates how such a stratified conception enables one to draw meaningful distinctions between pain and other emotive phenomena, such as suffering, illness, and despair. This paper concludes with some remarks concerning the significance of Scheler’s phenomenology of pain for pain research.
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A Diltheyan Loop? The Methodological Side of Heidegger’s Kant-Interpretation
Frank Schalow
Front. Philos. China. 2016, 11 (3): 377-394.
https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-005-016-0028-7
While scholars have paid considerable attention to Heidegger’s creative reinterpretation of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, little interest has been given to tracing the methodological steps by which the former’s work can house the key epistemic themes of the latter (e.g., those raised in the Critique of Pure Reason) within a broader, ontological problematic. To rectify this shortcoming, I propose outlining a “Diltheyan loop,” in order to make explicit a tapestry of presuppositions by which Heidegger anchors the epistemic themes of theoretical knowing (e.g., the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments) in the pre-theoretical, pre-predicative, and pre-discursive level of self-understanding (in which the possibility of understanding being [Sein] is also rooted). By showing how this “Diltheyan loop” is operative in the fore-structure of Heidegger’s Kant-interpretation, I will illuminate the overall strategy by which he recasts, retrieves, and reinterprets the key motifs of the Critique of Pure Reason, which at the same time will shed light on the controversies and criticisms that have arisen in the subsequent decades.
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Heidegger on the Struggle for Belongingness and Being at Home
Megan Altman
Front. Philos. China. 2016, 11 (3): 444-462.
https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-005-016-0032-2
In 1840, Alexis de Tocqueville coined the term “individualism” to refer to the tendency for Americans to withdraw into their own desires and interests, thus weakening and diminishing the “habits of the heart” that bind a generation to the customs of their forebears and contemporaries. A problem, though, is that modern individualism undermines the very ideals—i.e. autonomy, equality, and freedom—that motivated it in the first place. Understood as a way of life, liberal individualism is permeated by alienation, estrangement, and thoughtless patterns of conformism. In what follows, I hope to show that hermeneutic phenomenology as developed by Martin Heidegger marks an important break from the modern liberal individualistic outlook. The point is to undercut the contrived interpretations of our current historical tradition in order to demonstrate that belonging to and sharing in the struggles of a generation are conditions for being human at all. This critique does not provide a panoptic or definitive account of the basis of a genuine community, but does give us a richer sense of place and purpose, beyond even what the current polis/political community designates (though it certainly includes it).
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