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The Logical Style of Confucius’ Analects
Thierry Lucas
Front. Philos. China. 2020, 15 (2): 167-197.
https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-009-020-0011-4
Considered from a logical point of view, Confucius’ Analects contain many implicit forms of reasoning and argumentation. This is shown first by analyzing the phenomenon of parallelism: direct parallelism is often a way of hinting at a general assertion, whereas anti-parallelism hides dilemmas, generalizations and modal notions of “moral preference.” The Analects also have various types of conditionals, ranging from material implications, to modalized implications, and counterfactual conditionals, which are the germs of implicit reasoning, concluding with a moral recommendation. Analogies are particularly abundant and a presentation of three examples suggests that, beyond their explicative role, they also involve moral recommendations. The implicit logic of The Analects requires an active, albeit unconscious participation of the reader, which could be an important element in explaining the enduring influence of the text.
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Roles and Representations of Women in Early Chinese Philosophy: A Survey
Sarah Craddock, John Preston
Front. Philos. China. 2020, 15 (2): 198-222.
https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-009-020-0012-1
An understanding of the roles and representations of women in classical Chinese philosophy is here derived from central texts such as the Analects, the Lienü Zhuan, and the I Ching. We argue that the roles of women during the classical period of Chinese philosophy tended to be as part of the “inner,” working domestically as a housewife and mother. This will be shown from three passages from the Analects. Women were represented as submissive and passive, as with the qualities ascribed to yin energy, and therefore as rightfully subordinate to men. However, despite representations of women in philosophy being thus at this time, there were exceptions, specific women who could take a male “outer” political role. The story of Jing Jiang from the Lienü Zhuan suggests that although women being involved in “outer” affairs were looked down on, there were still women who would be and who would occasionally get praised for doing so. This shows that it was realized, explicitly or otherwise, that women were capable of taking those roles, but also that they were not allowed to take such roles at that time.
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Toward a Multi-Layered Chiasme-Focused Topology: A Reading of Merleau-Ponty’s Later Writings
MA Lin
Front. Philos. China. 2020, 15 (2): 242-269.
https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-009-020-0014-5
This paper traces the genealogy of reversibility, chiasma, and chiasme in Merleau-Ponty’s writings and offers a new characterisation of his later ontology in terms of a multi-layered chiasme-focused topology informed by subtle differences and interconnections among these notions. We need to grasp the significance of reversibility not only in terms of constant recoil and impossible overlap but also of its situatedness in the crisscrossing between Dasein and things, and between the inside/invisible and the outside/visible. “Chiasma” was initially introduced as a reference to the intersection of perspectives. Merleau-Ponty deploys it to articulate macroscopic insights concerning the nature of philosophy and the interweaving connections between self, other, and the world. In comparison, “reversibility” is primarily used to describe the microscopic bond between touching-touched and perceiving-perceived. I argue that, as Merleau-Ponty’s ultimate choice of wording, “chiasme” incorporated the significance of both “reversibility” and “chiasma.” A chiasme-focused topology that retains the significance of all three of the terms would serve to better convey the import of Merleau-Ponty’s later ontology, which aims to dissolve and to re-configure our conceptions about being, body, self, and the other from within and from below.
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Complete Virtue and the Definition of Happiness in Aristotle
HU Xinkai
Front. Philos. China. 2020, 15 (2): 293-314.
https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-009-020-0016-9
In this paper, I challenge the standard reading of complete virtue (ἀρετή τελεία) in those disputed passages of Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics. I argue that, for Aristotle, complete virtue is neither (i) wisdom nor (ii) a whole set of all virtues. Rather, it is a term used by Aristotle to denote any virtue that is in its complete or perfect form. In light of this reading, I offer a pluralist interpretation of Aristotelian happiness. I argue that for Aristotle, the life-long exercise of a predominant virtue—as long as it is exercised in its complete or perfect form—will suffice for human happiness. The so-called inclusivist and intellectualist notions of Aristotelian happiness, thus understood, are merely two forms (viz. the composite and the non-composite form) of the pluralist notion of Aristotelian happiness. And if I am right, my pluralist interpretation provides an alternative, if not better, solution to the long-standing problem of “dual happiness” in Aristotle.
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9 articles
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