Based on the framework of Bernanke & Blinader (1988) and Walsh (2003), this paper provides a concise analysis for relationship among money supply, banking lending and aggregate demand; and makes an empirical test on relationship among China’s money supply, banking lending and aggregate demand from 1994 to 2006 by adopting the single-equation regressive model and vector autoregressive model in terms of Keynesian structural model and monetarism simplified model. The result shows that money supply and banking lending have both played a driving role on real economy. Because of non-market interest rates, Keynesian structural model cannot explain the transmission mechanism of China monetary policies better than monetarism simplified model.

Using the reputation model of Kreps (1982), Vickers (1986) and Barro(1986), we develop a dynamic game model with incomplete information to examine the relations between the managers of state-owned enterprises(SOEs) in China and the government as the enterprise’s owner. Employing the model, we show that even a noncoopertive manager will not intrude the owner’s interests until the last period of his term in order to maximize his long term utility. The paper also discusses some phenomenona in state-owned enterprises in China, such as “insiders’ control”, “59 phenomenon” and excess on-the-job consumption.

We present a mixed oligopoly model for private banks and a public bank with mixed ownership and policy burden to research the program of strategic investor importing for state-owned banks. We find that close relationships exist among the equilibrium equity structure following strategic investor importing, the policy burden of state-owned banks and the number of private banks; that the policy burden of state-owned banks has positive relationships with the performance of private banks, with overall negative effect on social welfare; that the policy burden would not affect the maximum market capacity number of private banks but would affect the equity structure of state-owned banks with such a number.

This paper analyzes the interrelationship among competition, market size and innovation by using the data from total 37 industries in China within a simultaneous equations model. It finds that: (1) Competition and innovation are mutually-enhanced, and this is the consequence of the long-run Darwinian effect in competitive market; (2) Market size and innovation are also positively correlated, because firms’ innovation is essentially demand-oriented (market-oriented), and innovation impelling technological progress will finally increase market size; (3) Between competition and market size, the effect of competition on market size is ambiguous, while the reverse is significantly positive. The policy implication of this paper is as follows: under the condition that China has especially huge market size and market demand, the industry policy of intensifying competition can stimulate firms’ persistent demand-oriented innovation.

In China’s transitional economy, government regulation could be a substitute for the lack of law mechanism and regulator’s power could spill over into other areas not regulated. Then, theoretically it could construct implicit contracts. For example, China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has the rights to choose initial public offering(IPO) firms among applicants. It might construct implicit contracts between CSRC and local governments if the former consider the frequency and the severity of the scandals among different areas. Local governments could make decisions on whether and how much to implement the implicit contracts.

This paper develops an empirical model to test the spatial spillover effects of transport infrastructure on economic growth. It uses spatial econometric techniques and provincial panel data of China from 1993 to 2004 to analyze the contribution of transport infrastructure to the economic growth of local province and its spatial spillover effects on the economic growth of other provinces. The main findings include: (1) Transport infrastructure and economic growth of China show an evident pattern of spatial clustering. They largely congregate in developed eastern coastal regions, forming a gradient gradually diminishing from east to west. (2) Output elasticity of local transport infrastructure is 0.106, between the values calculated by early researchers with time series data and panel data. (3) Spatial output spillovers from transport infrastructure are largely positive, but evidences of negative spatial spillovers are also found with population density spatial weights matrix model.

The main research of this paper is the regional effects of marginal wage subsidies. Some regional economic issues are discussed such as production scales, operating profits, industry distribution, and expenditure distribution across the rich and poor regions. It is proven that, marginal wage subsidies improve the employment and raise the industrial share of the poor region, but meanwhile the expenditure share in the rich region increases for marginal wage subsidies. It is also showed that, the relationship between the effectiveness of marginal wage subsidies and the level of openness to trade is ambiguous when the wage level is very high, however, if the wage level is low enough thus marginal wage subsidies can cause relatively large employment increase, marginal wage subsidies cooperating with freer trade policy would be more effective.

The main purpose of this paper is to identify and measure the potential effect of property tax on speculative bubble in residential property market in China where the issue on the introduction of property tax is still fiercely debated. As a primary and necessary step, we firstly provide an empirical analysis on housing price dynamics of Tianjin. Moreover, this paper proposes a method to identify and measure the potential effect of property tax on speculative bubble in housing market. To capture the actual influence of property tax, we divide the effect into short-term one and long-term one and measure them respectively based on the information provided by estimation result of housing price structure.